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Since the state’s second constitution was adopted in 1972, Montana’s 
supreme court justices have been selected through a hybrid process that uses 
both a merit appointment system and an elective system. Though essentially 
an elective system, the appointment process is used when mid-term vacancies 
occur—when justices leave office during their terms. Between 1973 and 1994 
six vacancies on the state’s high court were filled by appointment and nine by 
election.
Montana’s hybrid system offers the material by which the theory of judicial 
selection, a theory which begins in the Revolution era of United States history, 
can be examined against its results. The judiciary presents a peculiar problem 
for democratic societies. It needs to be sufficiently independent from popular 
will to allow it to make impartial decisions that may displease the public, but 
are necessary to protect individual rights or to uphold the fairness of the law. 
At the same time, it must be responsive enough to the public to be consistent 
with basic democratic principles. To the extent that justices of the Montana 
Supreme Court make law, the “people” have a right to elect—or 
unseat—them.
The theory of judicial selection received a practical workout at the Montana 
Constitutional Convention of 1972. Delegates to that convention drew up the 
judicial article of the Montana constitution after debating the same theories 
that the national framers in 1787 worked through. They came to more 
populist conclusions than the national framers had. The appointment and 
election processes they designed have home out many of their fears. Recent 
elections and appointments are examined. Some of the people involved speak 
about the process. Nonpartisan elections are recommended to fill all 
Montana’s high court seats.
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CHAPTER I
EARLY HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION: COMPETING VALUES
A. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
Judicial independence is a confusing concept. Some of the confusion 
arises out of the pecuhar metamorphosis of the judiciary during the 
contentious decade of the 1780s. The final product of this conflict—an 
unelected national judiciary empowered with judicial review—leaves the 
impression that judicial independence has always been characterized in 
American government by a high degree of freedom from popular influence, 
freedom that flows from an assumption that the “professionalism” of the 
decision-making role of judges—the technical work of reviewing laws—should 
remove judges from popular selection. In fact, this profile took shape only after 
heated debate among the citizens of the early Republic who took seriously the 
loss of democratic accountability represented in the formation of an unelected 
judiciary empowered to negate some actions of their democratically elected 
legislatures. Examination of judicial independence is inextricably tied to an 
analysis of the judiciary's power, for the American judiciary armed with judicial 
review became a whole new political force, and independent in a way not all 
Americans had envisioned it. An examination of the diverse meanings of 
judicial independence in the American judiciary’s formative years brings new 
Ufe to the debate over judicial selection for Montana’s high court.
Gordon S. Wood, in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book The Radicalism of the 
American Revolution, calls the creation of the independent judiciary “the most
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dramatic institutional transformation in the early Republic.”! The conflict
that preceded the creation of this powerful judiciary reveals varied opinion
behind the definition of judicial independence. During this period, the
Federalists, led by James Madison, wrested the protection of “private property
and minority rights” away from “the interests of the enhanced public power of
the new republican govemments”2 in part through the creation of the national
judiciary. Wood writes:
These efforts to carve out an exclusive sphere of activity for the 
judiciary, a sphere where the adjudicating of private rights was removed 
from politics and legislative power, contributed to the remarkable 
process by which the judiciary in America suddenly emerged out of its 
colonial insignificance to become by 1800 the principal means by which 
popular legislatures were controlled and limited.3
The transformation from “colonial insignificance” to the “principal means by
which popular legislatures were controlled and limited” is in large measure the
story of arriving at tiie modem meaning of “judicial independence.”
The first American constitutions, those drawn up by states between
1776 and 1780, show a marked confusion over judicial independence. This
confusion arises in part because while in theory it was easy to declare the
judicial branch independent, in fact it was difficult to create an independently
powerful judidaiy without endowing it with some form of policy-making power.
Eventually, of course, this power would be the power of judicial review.
1 Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New 
York: Random House, 1991), 322.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 323.
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Nearly all the state constitutions framed prior to the national 
Constitution of 1787 contained specific language declaring an interest in 
separating the branches of government. These declarations no doubt owe their 
existence to their framers’ dedication to the political theory of Montesquieu, 
whose major contribution to the separation of powers “doctrine” was the 
addition of an ind pend en t judiciary.** But the state framers had a problem 
applying Montesquieu’s theory because it was based on a “mixed government” 
model predicated on a society with well-defined class barriers. Montesquieu’s 
interest in separation of powers was to divide power among different 
classes—monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.^ The English and French 
judiciaries did not provide good models for separation of powers in the early 
republics of the American states. The framers’ confusion over how to apply 
the concept of separation of powers to their judiciaries is evident in the fact 
that the provisions regarding judicial functions are found interspersed 
throughout their constitutions in articles describing both the executive and the 
legislative branches.
The earlier constitutions—those of Pennsylvania and New York, for 
example—contain provisions for the judiciary which do not clearly separate 
that branch from the legislative or executive. Both the duties and the 
personnel of the judicial branches in these constititions are sometimes shared
4 Edward J.Erler, “The Constitution and the Separation of Powers,” The 
Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy and Dennis 
J. Mahoney (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 153.
5 Ibid., 154.
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with the executive and legislative branches. In New York the body charged 
with the power most closely resembling "judicial review” was composed of the 
governor, chancellor and supreme court judges and could send legislation back 
to the general assembly on grounds that the legislation was incompatible with 
constitutional provisions, subject to a two-thirds-majority legislative override.6 
Pennsylvania, an anomaly among state constitutions because of its strongly 
democratic flavor, created a "Council of Censors,” a large elected body with the 
power to review all laws passed by the legislature and to throw out any that did 
not conform to the principles of the state’s constititution. Though its power 
most closely approximates what today is called “judicial review,” the 
Pennsylvania Council of Censors was not its Supreme Court, and looked much 
more like an arm of the legislative branch.?
Other clues show that Revolution-era Americans were divided over the 
meaning of judicial "independence.” Evidence from the first state constitutions 
points to the possibility that some factions in Revolution-era society wanted 
judicial independence for reasons other than to protect elite minorities and their 
property rights from the power of the majority’s will.
Most of the new state constitutions provided for life terms for state high 
court justices, limited only by the justices’ good behavior. Although this might 
seem to indicate an interest in removing the judiciary from the influence of the 
people, in fact, it may have been a step toward greater popular control. Willi
6 Francis Newton Thorpe, A Constitutional History of the American 
People, 1776-1850 (New York, 1898), vol. 5, 2628.
7 Thorpe, vol. 6, 3091.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Paul Adams suggests in The First American Constitutions that framers of early 
state constitutions were loath to use the British example that allowed terms to 
be limited “by the pleasure of the Crown.” Only South Carolina, Adams points 
out, retained the “during pleasure” (of the governor) language,® Viewed in this 
light, allowing judges to sit until they died or misbehaved enough to warrant 
impeachment showed some desire to hold judges accountable to the people, 
rather than to allow one person—a governor, or as in the past “the Crown”—to 
determine a judge’s fitness for office. Such provisions were less democratic 
than terms limited to a specified number of years, but term limitations of this 
nature were rare in early state constitutional provisions for the highest courts. 
(Pennsylvania, of course, provides the exception.)
Provisions for judicial salaries represent another aspect of state 
constitutions that may be misread when searching for the meaning of judicial 
independence. Certainly a salaried judidaiy was a more independent judidary, 
but independent of what? Marvin L. Michael Kay argues in “The North 
Carolina Regulation, 1766-1776: A Class Conflict” that the back country 
farmers who opposed the Whig elites in North Carolina during the 1776 
framing of its constitution favored a paid judidary, and that the provision 
establishing remuneration of supreme court justices by salary instead of by
® Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions: Republican 
Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 301.
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fees was a Whig concession to the agrarian majority.9 In some places, North 
Carolina among them, the “user fee” court system had helped to support the 
interests of a wealthy elite against the small land and tax claims of poorer 
settlers. 10 In North Carolina, at least, the salaried judiciary was meant to 
keep its courts independent of control by moneyed interests.
B. THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 
The judicial article in the national Constitution of 1787 would seem to 
represent the victory of the elitist vision of framers like James Madison over 
the more democratically inclined vision held by some of the earlier state 
framers. It is not that simple, though. Although the framers endowed the 
United States Supreme Court with independence from popular participation in 
the selection of Supreme Court justices, the power of the Court evolved over 
time. The framers did not give the Court the power of judicial review outright. 
They may have intended the Court to exercise judicial review, but they did not 
explicitly write that power into the Constitution. The power of judicial review is 
the key element establishing judicial independence from the other two 
branches of government. With the Constitution of 1787 the examination of 
judicial independence clearly requires two separate discussions, one about 
structural independence from the voters and the other about separation of 
powers among the three branches of government. Independence from popular
9 Marvin L. Michael Kay, “The North Carolina R e la t io n , 1766-1776: 
A Class Conflict.” In The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of 
American Radicalism, ed. Alfred F. Young (DeKalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1976), 107.
^oibid., 76.
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will was built into the Constitution through provisions for life terms for judges 
and selection by the president with confirmation by the Senate (the more elite 
of the two houses in the legislative branch). But independence from the 
legislative and executive branches was produced by the Court itself when it 
assumed the power of judicial review.
In fact, views on the principle of judicial independence vary depending on 
the observer’s understanding of the role of the Court. James Madison, the 
person whose vision of an independent judiciary probably most influenced the 
national model, provides a good example of the confusion that sets in when 
these two distinct types of independence — independence from the people 
versus independence from the other branches — converge in the national 
judiciary. Madison insisted that “an effective Judiciary establishment 
commensurate to the legislative authority was essential. A Government 
without proper Executive and Judiciary would be a mere trunk of a body 
without arms or legs to act or move.”ii Apparently Madison strongly favored a 
judiciary independent from the legislative and executive branches. Yet 
Madison was leary of allowing the unelected Supreme Court to practice judicial 
review. Madison’s recommendation in the Virginia Plan was to give a “council 
of revision” composed of “the Executive and a convenient number of the 
National Judiciary” the authority to examine “every act of the National 
Legislature before it shall operate, and every act of a particular Legislature
11 Ralph A. Rossum, “The Courts and the Judicial Power,” The Framing 
and Ratification of the Constitution, ed. Leonard W. Levy and Dennis J. 
Mahoney (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1987), 225.
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before a Negative thereon shall be final,” subject to a legislative o v e r r i d e .  12 
The proposal for the council of revision was defeated at the Philadelphia 
Convention. During the subsequent debate over extending the jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court to “all cases arising under this Constitution” and the laws 
passed by Congress, Madison “denied that the Supreme Court had a general 
power to interpret the C o n s t i t u t i o n . ” !^  In 1788 Madison reiterated his belief 
that the judiciary did not possess the general power of expounding the 
Constitution because that would elevate the judicial branch over the legislative 
b r a n c h .  14 I t  was to this limited judiciary that Madison extended independence 
from voter control.
The clearest example of the link between judicial independence from the 
people and the nature of judicial power comes from the Antifederalist essayist 
Brutus. Brutus would seem to agree that the unique character of the judiciary 
necessitated distancing it from popular selection. “[I]t would be improper,” 
Brutus wrote, “that the judicial should be elective, because their business 
requires that they should possess a degree of law knowledge, which is acquired 
only by a regular education, and besides it is fit that they should be placed, in a 
certain degree in an independent situation, that they may maintain firmness
i2/6td., 223.
13/bid., 235.
14 Ibid., 236.
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and steadiness in their decisions.”i5 But Brutus, who wrote in his No. XI essay 
that allowing the Court to judge all matters “in law and equity" would in effect 
give the Court power “to explain the constitution according to the reasoning 
spirit of it, without being confined to words or l e t t e r , ” 16 recommended a 
democratically selected superbody empowered to get rid of justices who 
displeased the popular majority. “This supreme controlling power [over the 
judiciary] should be in the choice of the people, or else you establish an 
authority independent, and not amenable at all, which is repugnant to the 
principles of a free government."!? Brutus envisioned a Court independent 
enough to interpret the Constitution; he was therefore not willing to give it as 
much indpendence from the people as Madison allowed it.
Brutus’ willingness to accept an unelected judiciary was not necessarily 
a typical sample of popular reaction to the new Constitution’s provisions for 
judicial selection. The framers’ desire to establish a professional judiciary very 
much independent of the people met with firm opposition. Wood claims 
“populist radicals” of the period went down swinging against the movement 
toward law as “a science removed from politics and comprehended by only an
15 Brutus, “Essays of Brutus," chap. in The Anti-Federalist: Writings by 
the Opponents of the Constitution, ed. Herbert J. Storing (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), No. XVI, 188.
i6 /6 id . No. XI, 164.
17 Ibid., No. XVI, 188.
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enlightened few who needed to be educated in special professional law
schools.”i8
This opposition was overcome by persistent efforts of the government 
itself. Wood claims, ‘The desire for an independent expert judiciary was bred 
by the continuing and ever renewed fears of democratic politics.”i9 By 1831, 
when Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America, the judiciary was 
sufficiently powerful and independent to suggest to Tocqueville that the courts 
“are the visible organs by which the legal profession is enabled to control the 
d e m o c r a c y .”20 The pre-1787 vision of the courts as a democratic institution, in 
which the “power of judging was to be exercised by juries drawn periodically 
from the people”; and in which “in the exercise of the jury function the people 
were themselves to be judges”2i was in temporary abeyance. Under the new 
national Constitution, “the establishment of an independent judicial power 
[meant] transforming [the] jury system into a judiciary and juries into 
j u d g e s . ”22 This “professionalism” of the law established another aspect of 
judicial independence, the one most responsible for the belief that the judiciary 
cannot be popularly selected. The idea of a highly trained, expert judiciary
18 Wood, 323. 
i9 /6 id .
20 Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America (Part 1, 278), as quoted in 
Wood, 325.
21 Erler, 153.
22/6id!., 154.
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evolved from the provisions in Article III of the 1787 Constitution and from
political pressures of the early Republic.
0 . JUDGES AS POLICY-MAKERS
Whether the framers intended it for them or not, justices assumed an
important policy role as soon as they asserted the power of judicial review.
Brutus’ fear that Supreme Court justices would be able to “explain the
constitution according to the reasoning spirit of it” became reality, though it
may have stopped short of his prediction that they would not be “confined to
[its] words or letter.” A justice’s power to negate legislation deemed
“unconstitutional” may be limited by strict constructionism or expanded by
broad interpretation. All justices believe they are confined by the words and
letter of the constitution, but each views that limitation differently. Within the
spectrum of varying judicial attitudes toward their freedom to interpret the
words of the Constitution fies the territory of “judicial discretion.” The variety
of acceptable definitions of judicial discretion is apparent in the views of two
distinguished twentieth centuiy Supreme Court justices, Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Felix Frgmkfurter.
Holmes, reacting against the common belief of his time that judges could
operate as disembodied automatons, weighing the pros and cons of any legal
problem dispassionately and without personal reaction, described the role of
the judge this way:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience....
The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules 
by which good men should be g o v e r n e d .  23
Holmes’ description sounds like modem judicial realism. Because the courts
have the power to affect policy, they will affect policy. Because the courts’
personnel is human, experience will color justices’ logic.
Like Holmes, Frankfurter sees a subjective element in the work of a
judge: the Court’s task, according to Frankfurter, “is to seize the permanent,
more or less, from the feelings and fluctuations of the t r a n s i e n t . ”2 4  But in the
same speech before the Pennsylvania Law School, Frankfurter went on to
express hostility to the idea that a Supreme Court justice is “left at large to
exercise his private w i s d o m . ”25 Somewhere between Holmes’ realistic
edlowemce that judicial decision-making is more experience than logic and
Frankfurter’s admonition that no judge is free simply to decide cases as he
pleases hes a very fine line, a very subjective line—the line which separates
permissible judicial policy-making from the impermissible.
Some argue that the independence of the judiciary from popular election
creates—and also in some measure should limit—the policy-making discretion
of the judiciary. Judge Richard Posner, a Reagan appointee to the federal
bench, writing in 1984 in favor of limits to judicial activism, lays the blame for
federal judicial activism squarely at the door of the political branches: “the
23/6id., 2.
24 Felix Frankfurter, “The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices,” 105 
University o f Pennsylvania Law Review 781, 793 (1957).
25 Frankfurter, 794.
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political branches are happy to shift responsibility for unpopular policies to the 
federal courts, which are a kind of lightning rod since the judges cannot be voted 
out of o f f i c e . ”26  Posner calls the modem legislative process “i m d i s c i p l i n e d ”27  
and charges that legislative waffling on the issues which divide society creates 
a vacuum which justices have no choice but to fill with decisions that amount 
to judicial lawmaking. When the legislative branch does act, it does so in such 
a way as to force the courts further into setting policy. “Some statutes indeed, 
are so general that they merely provide an initial impetus to the creation of 
bodies of frankly judge-made law,” according to P o s n e r . 2 8  Posner finds this 
especially disturbing in areas “on which there is no ethical c o n s e n s u s ”29  
(abortion, for example).
Posner faults constitutional interpretation as having fallen into similar 
patterns of judicial pohcy-making. Partly the inevitable result of moving away 
in time from the date of constitutional enactment, but “especially since many 
such provisions seem deliberately couched in vague and general terms,” 
justices’ interpretation of the Constitution is more and more simply justices 
setting public policy, Posner c l a i m s  .30
26 Richard A. Posner, “The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint” 59 
Indiana Law Journal 1, 13 (1984).
27 Posner, 6.
28 Posner, 5.
29 Posner, 17.
30J6id., 6.
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Montana’s Supreme Court has certainly been affected by judicial policy­
making of this nature. One justice demonstrated the court’s willingness to 
accept a policy-making role, writing in an opinion, “Where the Legislature fails 
to take cognizance of important legal obligations and fails to provide the 
appropriate remedies, this Court will not hesitate to act.”3i Such willingness 
to enter the legislative arena has placed the Montana Supreme Court in a 
number of controversial positions, probably the most noticeable of which was 
its central role in rewriting school funding legislation. The court’s critics have 
charged it with the “creation out of whole cloth of a ‘fundamental right’ [to 
access to the courts] limiting the l e g i s l a t u r e ”32 and of “rather cavalierly 
[disregarding] a recent constituent assembly and the authorized and good faith 
decisions of the legislative representatives.’’̂ ^
Posner suggests that, while the judicial independence written into the 
constitutional makeup of the judiciary invites judicial activism, that very 
structural independence should tell judges to limit their policy-making. He 
argues: “What can fairly be inferred from the constitutional scheme is that 
the judges are not to exercise the same freewheeling legislative discretion as
31 Frank Morrison, Fode v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 719 Pacific 
Reporter 2d 414, 416.
32 Supplemental Reply Brief of Montana Liability Coalition, Real Party 
in Interest at 43, State ex rel. Montanans for the Preservation of Citizen 
Rights V. Waltermire, Docket No. 86-400, as quoted in James J. Lopach, “The 
Montana Supreme Court in Politics” 48 Montana Law Review 267, 282.
33 James J. Lopach, “The Montana Supreme Court in Politics,” 48 
Montana Law Review 267, 296.
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the elected representatives.. ..”34 in other words, the framers could accept a 
limited policy-making role for unelected justices, but would balk at the policy­
making latitude allowed to unelected federal judges today.
D. JUDICIAL CHARACTER
Since justices are endowed with a policy-making power limited to a large
extent only by their own discretion, the character of judges becomes a central
issue. Like all the essential factors governing an effective judiciary, the debate
over judicial character—and over the best way to staff a court with persons
possessed of the necessary personal virtues—is as old as the first efforts of
states to create the third branch of government. The core elements of the
debate have changed little, even though at the state level methods of selection
have fluctuated between elitist appointment provisions to wide-open
democratic election and back again.
The essential qualities of good judges inspire endless commentary.
Michael Polelle, a professor at John Marshall Law School writing in favor of
reform to the selection of federal judges, suggests that Americans would do well
to read William Penn’s thoughts on the law from Penn’s 1682 tract The Frame
of Government of Pennsylvania:
I know some say, let us have good laws, and no matter for the 
men who execute them: but let them consider, that though good 
laws do well, good men do better: for good laws may want good 
men, and be abolished or evaded by ill men; but good men will 
never want good laws, nor suffer ill o n e s .3 5
34 Posner, 16.
35 Michael J. Polelle, “Selection of Federal Judges: Time for Reform?” 54 
Montana Law Review 1,57-8 (1993).
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Benjamin Cardozo echoes Penn in his enjoinder that “[tjhere is no guaranty of 
justice.. .except the personality of the j u d g e . ”36
The consensus of informed opinion on the qualities that make a good 
judge can be summed up in a paraphrase of Justice Potter Stewart’s 
exasperated statement about the difficulty of defining obscenity: no one is able 
to define precisely these qualities, but everyone knows them when they see 
them. Frankfurter called for both intellectual and moral qualities in 
“technically equipped lawyers” who are “widely read and deeply cultivated.” 
Among the judge’s moral qualities should be “a disposition to be detached and 
withdrawn.’’̂ ? “Greatness in the law,” Frankfurter summarized in his speech 
to the Pennsylvania Law School, citing examples of justices who fit each 
definition,
is not a standardized quality, nor are the elements that combine to 
attain it. [It may be] the power of penetrating analysis exerted by a 
trenchant mind [Bradley];.. persistence in a point of view forcefully 
expressed over a long judicial stretch [Field]; .. coherent judicial 
philosophy, expressed with pungency and brilliance 
[Holmes];.. resourceful deployment of vast experience and an originating 
mind [Brandeis];.. the influence of a singularly endearing personality in 
the service of sweet reason [Cardozo];.. [or] the kind of vigor that exerts 
moral authority over others [ H u g h e s ]  .38
Posner offers a vision of the “bedrock elements of judicial workmanship” which
mirrors Frankfurter’s:
36 Benjarcdn Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 16-17.
37 Frankfurter, 793-795.
38 Ibid., 784.
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Self-discipline (implying among other things due submission to the 
authority of statutes, precedents, and other sources of law), 
knowledge of law and thoroughness of legal research, a lucid 
writing style, a power of logical analysis, common sense, 
experience of life, a commitment to reason and relatedly to the 
avoidance o f‘result-oriented’ decisions in the narrow sense in 
which I should like to see the term used, openness to colleagues’ 
views, intelligence, hard work—.. all are indeed the bedrock 
elements of judicial w orkm anship .39
These definitions contain common elements—good judges are disciplined, 
smart and well-trained legally; they also have common sense and wisdom. The 
connection of these characteristic to the process of selecting judges becomes 
problematic because none of these qualities is readily apparent to an 
electorate, at least to an electorate informed the way the modem electorate is, 
through political campaigns which rely heavily on cosmetic information. 
Nevertheless, in almost half of the states, supreme court justices are 
popularly elected, at least in theory.
E. JUDICIAL SELECTION OF STATE HIGH COURTS 
Given the difficulty balancing the competing values involved, it is not 
surprising that there are almost 50 different methods used for selecting judges 
in the 50 states. “There is an almost endless combination of mechanisms used 
to select state judges,” wrote Lyle Warrick in the overview chapter of the 
American Judicature Society’s 1993 compendium of provisions for selecting 
state ju d ges.40  Generalizations can be made, however, especially if one 
narrows the focus to judicial selection procedures for state high courts.
39 Posner, 22.
40 Lyle Warrick, Judicial Selection in The United States: A Compendium 
of Provisions (Chicago: The American Judicature Society, 1993), 5.
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Warrick’s research reveals that states are equally divided today between those 
which hold elections for initial selection of supreme court justices and those 
which use nominating commissions to advise governors in supreme court 
justice appointments. Of the 22 states which elect their supreme courts 
initially, 10 hold partisan elections and 12 hold nonpartisan elections. While 22 
states fill high court vacancies with the commission/governor plan, Warrick 
documents 32 states using commission plans to aid the governor in selecting 
some or all of their judicial officers, with 10 of these having adopted or extended 
a previous commission plan during the 1980s.4i The AJS’ compendium had to 
be updated from its original 1980 publication in large measure simply because 
so many states had changed from elective to appointive systems. With so 
many states opting to jetison elected judiciaries, Montana’s system, which 
provides for initial election of all judicial officers and gubernatorial appointment 
of interim vacancies, deserves re-examination.
Proponents of an appointment process say it is a more efficient means 
of finding the most highly qualified persons. Their opponents argue that the 
political elements of this process—nomination and confirmation by “insiders” 
to the government’s power circles—produce judges who fit the political 
necessities of the well-placed, but who are not necessarily cast in the mold 
recommended by Frankfurter or Posner. In other words, if a Republican 
president is replacing a black Supreme Court justice, the president may want 
to scan the horizon to find a black Republican—any black Republican with the 
minimum qualifications for a Supreme Court appointment. That black
41 Ibid., 5-6.
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Republican may become a Supreme Court justice, not because the candidate 
is the most qualified—having, in fact, received the lowest ABA rating ever 
among persons considered for such appointments—but because this candidate 
fits the pohtical necessities, in this case being both black and a member of the 
Republican Party.
Debate over what constitutes a healthy measure of popular control over 
judicial selection has changed little in principle from the time of the Revolution. 
On its surface the evidence of judicial selection as it is practiced both on the 
federal and state level would appear to support Alexander Hamilton’s 
argument that allowing “the people” more control over the process of judicial 
selection is foolhardy. Hamilton argued that even allowing the House of 
Representatives a hand injudicial selection was going too far. The House, he 
argued, would be too slow, too “interested,” too divided among themselves in 
pohtical favors and debts, to produce an effective judiciary. Hamilton, of 
course, favored a judiciary chosen by one person thereby increasing 
accountability for the appointments and reducing (he believed) the chance of 
appointment of political hacks and c r o n i e s . 4 2  In fact, the reason so many 
states wanted to reform their elected judiciaries in the early 1900s was that
42 Gary Wills, ed. The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison and John Jay (New York; Bantam Books, 1982), Hamilton, Federalist 
No. 76, 384-385.
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machine politics had overtaken state judicial selection by the late 1800s,43 
exactly the fear Hamilton expressed in The Federalist,
All judicial selection processes involve a critical compromise. To get 
some of Hamilton’s elitist expertise in finding the most qualified judges, voters 
may he willing to give up some of the ideal of popular sovereignty. On the other 
hand, Montanans—at least in theory—currently trust the people with all the 
power of selection. Each variable in the selection process requires 
examination, not of its purpose, but of its results, for the purposes of judicial 
selection methods may not produce the intended r e s u l t s . 4 4
43 Madison B. McClellan, “Merit Appointment versus Popular Election: 
A Reformer’s Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida,” 43 Florida Law 
Review  535 (1991).
44 McClellan, 541.
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CHAPTER TWO
MONTANA GRAPPLES WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION 
AS IT REWRITES ITS CONSTITUTION IN 1972
INTRODUCTION 
Recent arguments about judicial selection are strikingly similar to old 
ones. When Montanans wrote a new constitution in 1972, the debate over 
judicial selection produced arguments and solutions that were mere 
restatements of founders’ philosophies. The main dispute separating delegates 
was whether to adopt a “merit” selection system. Under merit selection, 
judges are chosen by a citizen committee that screens candidates to recruit 
the best qualified persons. Though the idea gained momentum in the twentieth 
century at the state level, its thrust is in line with Brutus’ 1780 suggestion 
that federal judges be nominated through just such a “superbody.” Arguments 
against merit selection always hinge on the policy-making power vested in the 
judiciary, as they did when Madison and Hamilton wrestled with the issue.
That some would suggest that participation in judicial selection should be 
confined to a angle participant—the governor—would not surprise Hamilton 
devotees. That others would suggest that judges endowed with a policy-making 
role should be selected in a process that assures accountability to voters would 
not surprise students of Madison. Montana’s solution in 1972 was to retain 
the elected judiciary while revamping the system which produced interim 
appointments.
Dissatisfaction with Montana’s elective system of selecting judges 
brewed throughout the 1960s. Rumblings of discontent about the state’s
21
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judicial system in general were one of the major motivators behind the call for 
wholesale constitutional revision, a movement which accelerated through the 
late 1960s and culminated in the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Though the 
state’s system of electing its judiciary changed little as a result of the new 
constitution, the heated debate over the constitution’s judicial provisions 
reveals themes that run through all Montana’s politics and that connect 
Montana’s debate over judicial selection to those experienced nationwide since 
1776. Defining judicial independence and striking an acceptable balance 
between that independence and accountability to the people remain the central 
issues. Underlying each issue is the problem presented by “influence,” or the 
fear that the judiciary could be compromised if its selection allowed specific 
interests to gain control of the selection process.
In Montana’s politics of 1972, the “influence” most suspected—and 
feared—was that of the state’s three great corporations, the Anaconda 
Company, Burlington Northern Railroad and Montana Power Company. Pear 
of this influence was a driving force in the general debate over the merits of 
electing judges versus appointing them. The convention flip-flopped twice over 
what was then a novel idea—publicly financed judicial elections, a 
recommendation bom entirely out of a desire to avoid an unhealthy wielding of 
influence on the courts. The jagged course that this proposal took through the 
convention shows again and again the importance delegates attached to 
“influence.”
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A. MONTANA'S MOVEMENT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM, 1966-1972 
The movement for judicial reform took its first official step when 104 
citizens met to examine weaknesses in the state’s judicial system at a 
September 29,1966, conference in Great Falls. The citizens determined, 
among other things, that “[p]resent nonpartisan elections have not succeeded 
in removing Montana judges from political pressures and uncertainties.’’45 The 
citizens’ report recommended that judges be nominated by a screening board 
and appointed by the governor to be approved or disapproved at intervals by 
the voters. The delegation further recommended that a committee begin to 
study revamping Montana’s judicial system, especially its selection process. 
This committee studied the judicial system for five years before submitting the 
so-called “Montana Plan” to the Constitutional Convention. In the interim, 
David R. Mason and William F. Crowley, both University of Montana Law 
School professors, published their 1967 Montana Law Review article, 
“Montana’s Judicial System—A Blueprint for Modernization,” which formed 
the substance of the eventual Montana Plan.
In their article Mason and Crowley concentrated on selling a more 
centrally controlled and—they hoped—more efficient judiciary, a “system” with 
the supreme court as the administrative authority over the lower courts. The 
lower courts would be reorganized to reflect Montana’s new urban population 
majority. The article did not emphasize judicial selection, but the professors did 
recommend that the state’s constitution should be amended to “[p]ermit the
45 “Judicial System Reforms Sought,” The Billings Gazette, October 2, 
1966, 25.
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legislature to provide methods of selection other than election for members of
the judiciary.”46
In October 1971, with the election of delegates to the constitutional 
convention in sight, the University of Montana Law School unveiled its 
Montana Plan, the product of five years’ development. The elements of judicial 
selection under the Montana Plan were refinements of the Missouri Plan, the 
prototype for “merit” selection proposals.4?
Under the Montana Plan both supreme court justices and district court 
judges would be chosen by the governor from lists of two to four neimes 
submitted by a nominating committee composed of lawyers and members of 
the general public. Once on the bench, judges would run “against their records” 
periodically—that is, unopposed by alternative candidates. Should voters elect 
to retire a judge under this system, the screening committee would nominate 
new judicial candidates and the governor would appoint one from among these 
nominees. Further, a “research and qualifications” committee of lawyers, 
judges and members of the public would have authority to investigate improper 
judicial conduct and to recommend that a judge be retired, censured or removed
46 David R. Mason and William F. Crowley, “Montana’s Judicial 
System—A Blueprint for Modernization,” 29 Montana Law Review 1 (1967), 8.
47 The movement for merit selection of judges began in the early 1900s 
and was implemented full scale for the first time in Missouri in 1940. Merit 
selection was a reaction against state judicial election campaigns, especially 
those of the late nineteenth century, which were dominated by party machine 
politics. Sandra Muckelston, “The Judiciary,” Constitutional Convention Study 
No. 14, 136.
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from the bench.48 The law school's committee presented this plan as an 
alternative to the 1889 Constitution’s elective provisions.
B. DEBATE OVER THE JUDICIARY AT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
1. General Sparring 
The convention’s judiciary committee split 5-4 regarding the Montana 
Plan, with the minority supporting it.49 The committee’s split was indicative of 
the whole convention’s sharp division over the judiciary. Debate over the plan 
on the floor of the convention reveals that elective-versus-appointive judiciary 
was the stickiest issue about the judicial article, although the whole article was 
controversial.
The division of opinion boiled down to a decision whether to support a 
“modernized,” but admittedly experimental, court system along the lines of the 
Montana Plan, or to adhere to the old system with its populist features, the 
most obvious of which was the election of judges. Because the initial floor 
debate on February 26 was dominated by lawyers and confusing to many 
delegates, the convention became mired in uncertainty. The division among
48 Daniel J. Foley, “Court revamp unveiled,” Billings Gazette, October 
16, 1971, 1.
49 Judiciary committee chairman David Holland (Butte) and delegates 
Cedor Aronow (Shelby), Leslie Eskildsen (Malta), Rod Hanson Fairfield) and 
John Schiltz (Billings) voted as the majority against the Montana Plan. 
Committee vice-chariman Catherine Pemberton (Broadus), Jean Bowman 
(Billings), Ben Berg (Bozeman) and Mason Melvin (Bozeman) voted in favor of 
the Montana Plan. Jean M. Bowman, “The Judicial Article: What Went 
Wrong?” 51 Montana Law Review 429, 494 n. 7.
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delegates inspired Chairman Leo Graybill, a Great Falls lawyer, to abandon his
characteristic non-committal attitude and to offer the delegates some advice:
[T]his is, of course, a complicated area and you must either 
choose to become educated or you must choose to follow 
one of the two leads, the majority or the minority 
report.. ..[E]ither make up your mind to become educated or 
find some bellwether to follow and w ell try and get through 
this on Tuesday rather rapidly.so
Delegates seeking knowledgeable “bellwethers” had a large cast to 
choose from at the convention. The floor leaders for the debate were Dave 
Holland, a 47-year-old Butte lawyer who supported the majority report, 
including an elected judiciary, and Ben Berg, a 55-year-old Bozeman lawyer 
who wanted an appointed judiciary and supported the minority report. 
However, Holland and Berg were not the only lawyers at the convention who 
could tutor unschooled delegates. In fact, nearly a quarter—24—of the 100 
delegates were lawyers, the largest occupational group represented at the 
convention. 5i By contrast, farmers/ranchers, the second largest occupational 
group represented, had 19 delegates. 52
50 Montana Constitutional Convention Transcripts, (hereafter 
Transcript), 1979, 1057.
51 The preponderance of lawyers was a standing joke at the convention, 
and one that was exercised regularly during the debate over the judiciary. 
Delegates often facetiously requested one lawyer or another to “translate” a 
provision, or joked about the lawyer influence. (“DELEGATE AASHEIM: Mr. 
President, could a simple citizen ask a question? (Laughter).”; or, from 
Aasheim again, “Mr. President, I’m going to wait until the legal fraternity gets 
their arguments settled, then I’m going to ask mine ”) Montana Constitutional 
Convention Transcript, (hereafter Transcript), 1979, 1057.
52 “More lawyers, less ranchers,” Billings Gazette, Constitutional 
Convention pullout, January 16, 1972, 9.
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Though the whole article inspired division among delegates, the most
divisive issue was judicial selection. Delegate Magnus Aasheim’s motion to
postpone any discussion of Section 2 (powers of the judiciary) until the
Tuesday session indicates the importance delegates attached to the method of
judicial selection;
It looks to me like we’re giving the court powers before we 
know how they are to be selected. Now, later on, we are 
going to determine whether they are going to be elected by 
the people or by some body, and I think—in my judgment, 
it would make a difference how much power we are going to 
delegate them... .53
Aasheim’s logic carried the vote on Section 2. After the convention was unable 
to come to terms on sections 3 (supreme court organization) or 4 (district court 
powers), the delegates voted to adjourn and take up the whole article fresh the 
following Tuesday.
Over the weekend, an informal committee of lawyers met to iron out 
differences between the minority and majority positions so that the floor 
debate would be better managed and less confusing to delegates not as familiar 
with the court system. Cedar Aronow and Jack Schiltz, both lawyers and 
members of the judiciary committee, met with Berg and James Garlington, a 
lawyer from Missoula. Aronow began Tuesday’s debate by outlining the 
general compromises this group had arrived at and noting the differences they 
could not get around. Among these differences, of course, was judicial 
s e l e c t i o n . 54 As the floor debate over selection shows, divergent
53 Ibid., 1043.
54 Ibid., 1069.
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beliefs—strongly held, persuasively argued, and grounded in opposing 
principles—underpinned the separation regarding judicial selection among 
delegates. The debate further reveals that a lot of the separation sprang from 
different ideas about “influence,” and how best to insulate the courts from it.
2. Arguments Favoring an Appointive Plan
The arguments presented to delegates at the convention for appointed 
judges involved four main points: (1) the screening committee would produce 
better judges because it would study qualifications professionally and 
dispassionately; (2) the elective system already in use was not really elective 
because so many judges were initially appointed to the bench, then ran as 
incumbents, an advantage that nearly always secured their re-election; (3) 
accountabihty to voters would actually be improved by the people's 
representation on the screening committee, as opposed to the existing 
nomination system, which vested full appointment power in the governor; and 
(4) judges would have to run on their records, which allowed enough voter 
accountability.
Just as Brutus pointed out in the Antifederalist papers of the 1780s, so 
delegates to Montana's Constitutional Convention also argued: judges required 
a “degree of knowledge” and education, which created unique problems for their 
democratic selection. The idea behind the minority report's plan for judicial 
selection was systematically to identify, recruit and select good judicial timbre 
among the legal community. The judiciary committee's minority report left the 
design of the judicial nominating committee to the legislature, but 
recommended that the legislature create a large “blue-ribbon” committee, with
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membership statutorily nonpartisan and representative of widely varied 
geographical regions. The minority report favored a large committee to reduce 
influence by “some vested interest.”̂ ® To secure democratic accountability, 
the plan called for senate confirmation of the governor's nominee chosen from 
among two to three names submitted by the nominating committee. Finally, in 
the first primary election following an appointment, the new judge's name 
would appear on the ballot. As a compromise to populism, the minority plan 
amended the Montana Plan to provide that any lawyer could run against the 
judge in this first primary election. After that, however, judges would run 
against their records every four years in the general election.56
Most delegates supporting the appointed judiciary commented about the 
inability of the electorate to know enough about judicial candidates to make 
good choices. Berg, introducing the minority plan, said good judges are 
impartial, skilled and know their business. They must have the courage of 
their convictions and be “free from the onslaught of prejudice”—not traits, Berg 
argued, that win popularity. Qualities that make a candidate popular would 
not necessarily make a good judge, Berg argued. The minority plan was a 
superior selection process because candidates would get “a good, thorough 
screening” by “eighteen men” bent on finding the most qualified person.^?
55 Ibid., 1023.
^eibid.
57 Ibid., 1024.
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The second major argument voiced by supporters of the minority report 
was grounded in the belief that judges were more often initially appointed than 
elected under the existing “elective” system. Jean Bowman, a Billings League 
of Women Voters activist, addressed this point in the early debate over 
selection, complaining that the system was in effect an appointive one marred 
by very limited participation: the governor alone selected judges for interim  
appointments “without consulting a n y b o d y . ”58 Further, Bowman said, once 
appointed, a judge sat for life because “we [voters], more or less like sheep, go 
and reappoint them.”59 Bowman argued that, since the so-called elective 
process was in practice a fairly undemocratic appointive one, the minority 
recommendations would actually increase democratic involvement.
The arguments about the appointive nature of the elective system  
require some statistical explanation. Research on Montana’s elected supreme 
court shows that, between 1889 and 1977, 64 percent of supreme court 
justices began their tenures with election. However, from the time those 
elections became nonpartisan in 1936, the instances of justices gaining seats 
initially through election drops to 61 percent. It is widely believed that 
incumbency confers an almost insurmountable advantage in judicial elections. 
In fact, incumbents in Montana do win supreme court elections easily: 
between 1948 and 1985 only one supreme court justice failed to achieve re- 
election. Yet appointment to the bench does not bestow the incumbency
58 Ibid., 1091.
59/6id., 1031.
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advantage automatically: only seven of fifteen appointees to the supreme
court between 1889 and 1977 who ran for the court following their
appointment regained their seats.^o Whether delegates’ fears about the
advantages of incumbency were real or perceived (four out of the five justice
sitting on the supreme court in 1972 had been appointed originally), these
worries occupied much of the debate over the judiciary.
Finally, delegates touted the minority plan’s requirement that judges run
against their records as sufficient for voter accountability. The minority plan,
Berg said, still leaves the judge “facing a very powerful electorate outside his
door every four years.” This should assuage the fears raised by the majority
that the appointive system would produce arrogant “tyrants,” Berg said. 6i
3. Arguments for Elected Judges
Arguments for elected judges relied on three main supports. The first
was that the judicial powers, especially the powers of the supreme court,
necessitated a popular check. Schiltz underscored the policy-making nature of
the supreme court’s role and its relationship to electoral accountability:
[Ijt’s more important to elect supreme court judges than it 
is district court judges. The district court judges aren’t 
making policy. And it’s the policy that the supreme court 
makes that should be rejected or adopted by the 
electorate.. ..[W]e have, with Mr. Holland’s plan [for an 
elected judiciary] the Wst screening process in the world, 
and that is the electorate. 62
60 James J. Lopach, We the People of Montana: the Workings of Popular 
Government, (Missoula, Mont.: Mountain Press, 1983), 156-158.
61 Transcript, 1024.
62 1090.
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Or , as Schiltz wrote in 1993, still defending an elected judiciary, “they should 
go to the people periodically to atone for their stewardship.”63 On a more 
ideological plane. Cedar Aronow pointed out that “no matter what broad 
powers or rights you provide for people in the Bill of Rights, the value of those 
rights [is] dependent entirely on how the court interprets them.”64 Aronow's 
comment reflects a belief that what the delegates wrote in 1972 would be given 
life through court interpretation, and that the judges entrusted with this power 
must be accountable to the citizens.
The second supporting argument was that election produces the best 
judges. Contrary to Berg’s assertion that the electorate was ill-equipped to 
identify judicial expertise, Holland suggested that election produces judges who 
are politicians, and “the basic attributes of a politician are actually pretty good 
for a j u d g e . ” 65 “Basically,” Holland elaborated, “what you want is a fair man 
who can comprehend what the law is and hope he has enough human 
understanding to get b y . ” 66 Holland suspected that appointed systems allowed 
“arrogance” to creep into the judiciary, and pointed to judges on the federal 
bench as an example.
63  John M. Schiltz, Letter to Eileen Sheehy, December 1993.
64 Transcript, 1069.
65 Ibid., 1016.
66 Ibid., 1017.
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The pivotal eirgument regarding elective selection had to do with 
influence. This argument gave the majority report the swing vote necessary to 
create a majority. Rod Hanson, a Democrat and electric co-op manager from 
Fairfield who served on the nine-member committee, said he came to the 
convention favoring the appointment process recommended in the Montana 
Plan, but changed his position because he decided a judicial nominating 
conunission would be particularly susceptible to corporate influence. He had 
learned that the sixteen-member commission formed to advise the judiciary 
committee—whose bi-partisan appointments by the house of representatives, 
senate, supreme court and governor intended to produce an impartial 
body—included four attorneys for the Montana Power Company, one of whom 
became chairman of the commission.^? Hanson said he voted for an elective 
plan because he thought corporate control of a statewide election would be 
harder to achieve than corporate control of an eighteen-member committee.
In fact, the minority plan reflected the power of this argument, too. 
Rather than commit the design of the nominating committee to the 
constitution, Berg found it necessary to leave that design to the legislature.
The reason for this, as various comments in the transcript attest, was that 
the judiciary committee could not agree on a design that would insulate the 
committee from corporate influence.
67 Ibid., 1027, 1090-91. The 1971 Legislature created the Montana 
Constitutional Convention Commission to supply historical, legal and 
comparative information about the Montana Constitution to delegates to the 
1972 Constitutional Convention.
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Both sides tried to divine the wishes of the electorate as to appointive or 
elective systems, and to claim those wishes supported their argument. Berg 
said the main people to please with judicial selection were “not judges, but 
citizens,” and that the appointive system is what the citizens wanted.68 
Bowman argued that to offer the Holland plan to the voters who would 
eventually ratify the constitution would be to offer them no choice at all. The 
people should be given a chance to vote on an appointive judiciary, she said.69
Holland argued the opposite point: “I submit to you that the people of 
this state want to elect their judges and, if we come out of here with an 
appointive system .. .this thing alone.. .could bring down the whole 
Constitution.”70 Holland cited a variety of polls to support his claim. First, a 
survey done by political science students at the University of Montana 
February 7-22, 1972, found that 125 of 189 persons questioned rejected 
judicial appointment. Although law students polled supported an appointment 
process 67-16, a poll of lawyers in general practice favored an elected judiciary 
256-241; among trial lawyers, an overwhelming 78-34 favored elected supreme 
court justices, with an even higher number favoring elected district court 
judges, 82-29.71
^^Ibid., 1022.
G9Ibid., 1091.
-JO Ibid., 1013.
71 Ibid., 1013-1014. Of course, lawyers’ desire to have judges elected 
may not spring entirely from devotion to democratic principles, a subject 
covered in greater detail on pages 50-56.
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After several inconclusive votes on selection, the convention finally 
agreed unanimously on the compromise provisions that form the current 
system for judicial selection in Montana. Under the current plan, judges are 
elected in an open election if no incumbent files. Incumbents may face 
challengers in both the primary and general election. If no challenger files 
against the incumbent, the incumbent must face the voters as an ‘‘accept or 
reject” option. Other vacancies are filled through gubernatorial appointment, 
but the governor is advised by a nominating commission whose membership is 
statutorily defined; the senate confirms judicial appointments. While this 
system is in some ways a hybrid of the majority and minority proposals, it is 
basically an elective plan.
4. The Battle for Publicly Financed Judicial Elections 
The question of corporate influence—or influence of any contributor to a 
judicial campaign—gave rise to the most interesting debate on judicial 
selection, the debate over public financing of judicial campaigns. A provision 
for publicly financed supreme court campaigns narrowly missed inclusion in 
the constitution, finally defeated on March 16—after a dramatic call of the 
convention to round up two missing delegates—in a 49-48 vote."̂2 (Although 
the majority of those voting favored the provision. Rule 51 of the convention 
stated that provisions included in the constitution had to pass by a majority of 
the elected delegates, a majority of 51.) The final vote came after the idea was 
voted in and out of the proposed constitution two different times.
2453.
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Public financing of judicial elections was proposed by Billings lawyer 
John Schiltz, a Democrat who had suffered a landslide defeat in an attempt to 
unseat Chief Justice James Harrison in 1970. Schiltz lost to Harrison 89,171 
to 28,568, after running on a platform that Harrison’s campaign contributions 
from corporate interests affected his decisions. Schiltz accepted no campaign 
contributions from lawyers. Schiltz submitted his proposal that all state 
judicial campaigns be publicly funded as a separate minority report from the 
judiciary committee on which he served. It was first debated on February 29, 
after the delegates had voted on the rest of the substance of the judicial article. 
It passed 46-45. Later the same day, the delegates reconsidered the provision; 
in its last action of the day the convention voted 49-47 to delete the section 
providing for publicly financed judicial campaigns. On March 13, with 11 
delegates absent, the convention voted 55-32 in favor of a revised provision 
that allowed for public financing of only supreme court elections. The new 
provision went to the Style and Drafting Committee, but was defeated March 
16 in the dramatic vote that closed the final debate on the judicial article as a 
whole.
The close votes on the section and its roller-coaster trip through the 
subparagraphs of Roberts Rules of Order attest to the vigorous interest 
delegates had in the publicly financed elections, an idea which at the time was 
entirely new. Publicly financed presidential elections were still two years 
away, and the Watergate scandal, with its links to campaign finance and 
eventual campaign finance reform, was in its embryonic stages. Delegates’ 
comments on the provision reveal that, again, the central issue dividing
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delegates was “independence,” particularly independence from influence, either
perceived or real.
Schiltz argued that any discussion of independence for the judiciary
needed to address lawyers’ campaign contributions. “[T]his is your sole source
of campaign funds when you’re running for the Supreme Court. You either
have lawyers who give it to you in case you’d win or you have lawyers who are
afraid not to give it to you or you get it from lawyers who are genuinely
interested in your philosophy of what a court out to be.”73 Assuring the
“purity of our judges” could best be accomplished by eliminating lawyers as the
main source of campaign donations, Schiltz a r g u e d .7 4
Not only did delegates fear the influence of lawyers who contributed to
judicial campaigns, but, again, they greatly feared corporate influence.
Graybill stepped down from the chair in order to comment on this issue. Trying
to save the provision on its reconsideration on February 29, Graybill argued:
[T]he whole issue is are we going to let the Judiciary 
continue to get its money to run for contested Supreme 
Court offices by getting it from big.. corporations and 
concerns who have a lot of litigation in the Supreme 
Court?.. .[T]he Supreme Court ought to be a place where 
the few clients who use it a lot ought not to be able to 
contribute large sums to a Supreme Court c a n d i d a t e . . .
In a similar vein, arguing March 13 for the revised provision that affected
supreme court elections only, Wade Dahood, a lawyer from Anaconda, said.
73 Ibid., 1026.
74 Ibid., 1137.
75 iW ., 1167.
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“The taxpayer, above all, should have paramount interest in this proposal. He 
is the one that is affected by the quality of justice more than anyone else.” 
Dahood went on to detail the many cases decided in the supreme court that pit 
the interests of “ordinary taxpayers” against those of corporations—tax cases, 
assessm ent cases, zoning c a s e s .  . . B o t h  Dahood and Graybill saw public 
campaign financing as a tool by which the interests of “ordinary taxpayers” 
could be protected from the influence exerted by Montana’s big corporations, 
whose interest in the court was naturally greater than any citizen’s because 
the corporations appeared as parties in the supreme court more often.
Though publicly funded judicial campaigns failed to achieve 
constitutional status, the idea was tried on a small scale for a brief time. 
Between 1975 and 1993 campaigns for supreme court seats were given a 
share of the state’s public campaign fund. The money for this fund came from 
voluntary contributions from taxpayers who indicated their support through a 
check-off box on their Montana tax returns. Since “volunteering” funds this 
way meant paying money to the fund over and above one’s tax burden, 
participation was not high.77 The fund was eliminated in the 1993 session of 
the legislature because it had attracted a scant $1,600 per year, $1,200 less 
than the Department of Revenue claimed the fund’s administration cost the 
s t a t e . 7 8  The $1,600 had to be divided among candidates for the judiciary and
iQIbid., 2201 .
77 Minutes, House Appropriations Committee, March 29, 1993, 4. 
78/6id., 3.
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for governor and lieutenant governor. This experiment with publicly ûnanced 
elections clearly failed, but perhaps only because the voluntary nature of the 
contributions doomed the program from the start.
C. CONCLUSIONS 
The delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention could not 
agree how to solve the problem of influence in supreme court selection. They 
chose to retain an elective process at least in part to thwart such influence, 
then they narrowly defeated public financing of those elections. Montana 
history appears to show that judicial elections were more competitive when 
they were partisan. Since eliminating the elective process is probably unlikely, 
the next area of study will be an examination of the election of judges in 
practice, with emphasis on the election’s competitive qualities and its 
susceptibility to influence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER THREE
JUSTICES’ EXPERIENCE WITH THE ELECTIVE AND APPOINTIVE 
ASPECTS OF MONTANA’S JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
INTRODUCTION 
There is no perfect system of judicial selection. On that much justices 
agree. But the relative imperfections of the two main systems—appointive 
and elective—offer justices ample room for disagreement. Each justice finds 
specific imperfections distressing. One complains that the electorate is poorly 
informed and too demanding; another that the Judicial Nomination 
Commission is staffed by political hacks. The questions raised by justices who 
have experienced judicial selection firsthand reflect the same conundrum that 
stymied the framers in 1789: how can the judiciary be responsive to people 
while maintaining judicial independence and impartiality? The state’s 
constitutional framers offered a hybrid system of appointment and election as 
a practical solution to this dilemma. One justice has called their solution the 
worst of any of the fifty states.?^ Another justice sums up the problem of 
balancing the competing values of independence and accountability: it is not 
that there is no good system for choosing judges, but there is no perfect 
system, and the advantages of one system tend to be the reverse of the 
advantages over the other.^o
79 Lopach, 150. The sentiment is Justice John C. Harrison’s.
80 Karla M. Gray, interview by author, Tape recording, Helena, 
Montana, March 11, 1994. Transcript, 2.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
The issues that separated Antifederalists from Federalists in 1789 and 
Montana’s constitutional framers Dave Holland and Dan Berg in 1972 also 
separate justices on the Montana Supreme Court today. Just as beliefs among 
constitutional framers writing almost 200 years apart turned on their 
individual views of the policy-making role of the judiciary, so with some of 
Montana’s justices. Not surprisingly, the justice who views the court’s policy­
making power to be narrow and confined is more comfortable with an 
appointive judicial selection process. The justice who believes the court makes 
policy “every day of the week ” prefers the elective process of selection. Within 
the election process there is room for further division of opinion among those 
most intimately familiar with it. Some justices favor vigorous campaign 
debate; others feel more confined by the Canons of Judicial Ethics. All three of 
the justices interviewed felt uncomfortable with the current system of judicial 
election finance.
A. VIEWS ON THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING POWERS 
DEFINE JUSTICES’ VIEWS ON ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PUBLIC
Justices view the role of the court differently. Chief Justice Jean 
Tumage, who was elected to the court in 1984 to replace Chief Justice Frank 
Haswell, described the court’s policy-making power as extremely limited. 
“Under our constitution we cannot legislate, but we can create law .. .when 
there is no legislation to cover that matter,” Tumage said. “If we will uphold 
our oath of office we must recognize that people create the law through their 
legislature and not through the courts.”?? Justice Karla Gray, appointed
?? Chief Justice Jean A. Tumage, interview by author, Telephone 
interview, Billings, Montana, February 28, 1994.
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initially in 1991 to fill a midterm vacancy created by the resignation of Diane
Barz, echoes Tumage’s view of the strictures placed on judicial policy-making.
“Our policy-making role is a very small part of what we do. There are cases
certainly where we do make policy directly.... But those are primarily sort of
development-of-the-common-law kinds of issues. And they are relatively few
and far between.”'̂ ® Justice Terry Trieweiler, who was elected initially in 1990
and then tried unsuccessfully to unseat Chief Justice Tumage in the 1992
election, differs sharply from Tumage and Gray;
[W]e make policy every time we decide a gray area of the law. I 
agree that if  a statute is clear then we have no business varying 
from its plain language. But if it's clear it doesn’t often get up 
here. The only reason it usually gets here is because it’s unclear 
and in order to apply it we need to apply our own value system to 
arrive at what we think is the proper result.... Everybody who is 
here knows we do that every day of the week. What they don’t 
want you to know is that they’re doing it from a value system  
different from y o u r s . 7 9
With views on their roles this widely separated, it is scarcely surprising 
to find Trieweiler on the opposite end of the spectrum from Tumage and Gray 
regarding judicial selection processes. Trieweiler’s support for the elective 
process is much more vigorous than either Tumage’s or Gray’s. Tumage 
takes a realist’s position regarding the merits of elective systems versus those 
of appointive ones. “In Montana there is little or no possibihty of appointed 
judges. We are a state that wants to and will hang on to the right to vote for 
people, including judges,” Tumage said. He pointed out that the state requires
78 Gray interview transcript, 3.
79 Terry N. Trieweiler, interview by author, Tape recording, Helena 
Montana, March 11, 1994. Transcript, 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
43
appointed judges to run “promptly,” at the first statewide election following 
their appointment. Yet Tumage is critical of appointive systems in general, 
noting that “no one yet has come up with a sanitized method of appointment.” 
Tumage said appointment processes tend to be tainted by partisan politics.so 
Gray favors an appointive judiciary over an elected judiciary, but 
strongly criticizes the federal system of appointment because of its life 
tenures.81 Gray would prefer a variation on the Missouri Plan, with a provision 
for retention elections. She adamantly suggests that the appointing body have 
“plenty of public input,” including a provision for open meetings.82
Trieweiler’s view is the polar opposite.83 “[T]he appointive judiciary is a 
farce,” he said. “I think it’s much more political than elections.”®̂ Trieweiler 
holds that appointed justices become better judges after they face an election 
because “an election is a very humanizing experience. It’s a very leveling 
experience.... You do humbling things day after day after day. And that makes 
you a better person. It gives you a broader, a deeper perspective, a greater
80 Tumage interview.
81 Gray interview transcript, 5.
82 Ibid., 14.
83 Interestingly, Gray, who favors an appointment system of judicial 
selection, first won her seat on the court through appointment. She says she 
doubts she would have served on the court if she had had to run in the first 
instance. (Gray interview transcript, 1.) Conversely, Trieweiler, who favors an 
elective system first won his seat through election, and says he doubts he 
could ever have been appointed. (Trieweiler interview transcript, 9.)
84 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
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range of v i s i o n . ”85 Trieweiler offered as an example his belief that he is a 
better judge on tribal jurisdiction issues as a result of campaigns which forced 
him to meet with tribes on Montana’s seven reservations.
Gray shared some of Trieweiler’s beliefs about the effect of elections on 
judges, but said that retention elections were sufficient to provide the benefits 
of the election process. think it is a good idea, even though we are not a 
political body and are not supposed to take popularity polls on the issue[s] and 
then vote accordingly. The system where you never have to go out there and 
meet Montanans, I mean real live people, and ask them for their vote and their 
support—I think it’s important that we keep that,” she s a i d .  86
However, Gray’s view of the role of a justice in the political process 
limited her willingness to give all the selection power to the people. She 
identified several pitfalls awaiting justices on the campaign trail. Voters are 
accustomed to electing representatives and to holding their elected officials 
accountable for their representation. Voters who do not believe their legislator, 
governor or city council member is representing their views are entitled to 
unseat those representatives. Although Montana’s justices are elected and 
must campaign fike any other elected official seeking support, Gray points out 
that justices “are not elected to respond to the public w ill.. or what a majority 
of people in a district or in the state.. might think about a given issue on any
85 Ibid., 8.
86 Gray interview transcript, 6.
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given day.... People are not supposed to call us and lobby us for r e s u l t s . ”®? 
Gray's experience campaigning taught her that voters do not readily accept 
the difference between her candidacy for the supreme court and someone else’s 
candidacy for the state legislature. “To most voters if  you’re running for 
election you’re a politician. If you’re a politician they can and should hold your 
feet to the fire about your views on everything from soup to nuts.”®® Gray said 
voters get frustrated when judicial candidates cannot answer some questions 
because of judicial ethics and cannot make any campaign promises.
B. JUDICIAL ETHICS AND CAMPAIGNING JUSTICES 
The strictures placed on judicial candidates by the Canons of Judicial 
Ethics raise difficulties for campaigning justices. The race between Tumage 
and Trieweiler in 1992 spotlighted these issues vividly. In a campaign called 
“nasty” in news accounts,®9 the candidates split early and decisively over the 
scope of allowable comment under the Canons of Judicial E th ic s .A f t e r  
appearing together at a meeting of the Senior Citizens Association in Conrad
®7 Gray interview transcript, 2.
88 Ibid., 3.
89 Loma Thackeray, “Trieweiler snipes at Tumage for skipping debate,” 
The Billings Gazette, September 26, 1992, 3B.
90 The canons’ provision on candidacy for office states: “A candidate for 
judicial position should not make or suffer others to make for him, promises of 
conduct in office which appeal to the cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or 
electing power; he should not announce in advance his conclusions of law on 
disputed issues to secure class support, and he should do nothing while a 
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office 
with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.” Lawyers' Deskbook & 
Directory 1991-1992 (Helena, Montana: State Bar of Montana), 266.
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August 29, 1992, each candidate hurled charges of impropriety at the other, 
including accusations of violations of the canons. Tumage claimed, among 
other things, that Trieweiler acted unethically by discussing a case before the 
high court. Trieweiler said he made only a passing reference to the case in 
question, a May 1990 decision in which the court limited the amount of money 
that can be awarded when contracts are broken. He said he addressed more 
fully a case regarding tax refunds to federal retirees. Since no official record of 
the meeting was kept, there was no definitive answer about the charges and 
countercharges.91 The candidates never appeared together again. In late 
September, Trieweiler publicly criticized Tumage for missing a scheduled joint 
appearance before the Yellowstone County Bar Association. Association 
president Rick Cebull read a letter from Tumage excusing his absence. The 
letter explained that Tumage had a previous commitment in Westem  
Montana and again accused Trieweiler of referring to pending c a s e s . 9 2  The 
pending cases remained unnamed and the voters were not informed beyond the 
newspaper account detailing Tumage’s complaints about Trieweiler and 
Trieweiler’s equally damning complaints about Tumage.
If voters relied on press accounts to inform them about the division 
between Trieweiler and Tumage regarding the Canons of Judicial Ethics, they 
were not only underinformed, but were almost certainly confused by a canon 
that would not allow comment on certain cases or issues, yet was apparently
91 “Justice candidates trade accusations again,” The Billings Gazette, 
September 2, 1992, B l.
92 Thackeray, “Trieweiler snipes...,”pp. cit., 3B.
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mute regarding personal attacks. Though press accounts were sketchy with 
details of supporting arguments behind charges of ethical violations of the 
canons, they documented generously the personal charges and countercharges 
leveled as the campaign unfolded. These charges included: Trieweiler decrying 
Tumage’s participation in bank cases while serving on a bank board and 
Tumage’s reply that Trieweiler improperly represented himself at the high 
court in a case involving a dispute with Trieweiler’s Whitefish neighbors;93 
Tumage’s claim that Trieweiler hoped to unseat him in order to pack the court 
with “former trial lawyers such as himself” and Trieweiler’s answer that such 
a charge “would really be s t u p i d ” ;94 Trieweiler’s counter-claim that Tumage 
“run[s] this court like the Legislature rather than a court” and that Tumage 
had too close a political relationship with the current govemor Stan 
S t e p h e n s ; 9 5  and Tumage’s salvo that Trieweiler’s “very big ego” and deep 
pockets were the driving forces behind his candidacy.96 Though each news 
story reflected an effort to get to the bottom of each of the charges flung, the 
overwhelming weight of the coverage reflected a campaign rightly called 
“nasty.”
93 “Justice candidates trade accusations again,” The Billings Gazette, 
September 2, 1992, B l.
94 Bill Skidmore, “Tumage says Trieweiler seeks to ‘pack’ high court,” 
The Billings Gazette, September 30, 1992, 5C.
95 Skidmore, “Court candidates trade charges, ” The Billings Gazette, 
June 26, 1992, 2B.
96 “Tumage lashes out at Trieweiler,” The Billings Gazette, June 24, 
1992, 8A.
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In the waning days of the campaign the Lee Enterprise newspapers 
commissioned a poll of voters which revealed that Trieweiler’s decisive edge 
over Tumage in the primary (56 percent to 44 percent) was gone. In its place 
was a race too close to call, with roughly 18 percent of the voters registering 
“unfavorable name recognition” to both candidates.^? Trieweiler ended up the 
loser, by a margin so close (194,747 to 193,706) that he considered asking for a
recount.98
If this is what elections for the supreme court can be, is the elective 
process healthy? Tumage said the press’ natural inclination to emphasize 
confrontation rather than consensus (“someone could be elevated to sainthood 
in Bilhngs and they wouldn’t pay any attention to it”) did not damage the court. 
Further, he said the coverage of the campaign, while lamentably not “a really 
scholarly job,” did produce an informed electorate. However, Tumage said he 
would be happier with press coverage that analyzed the role of the court in 
peoples’ lives.99 Trieweiler also expressed some dissatisfaction with press 
coverage, particularly of the campaign’s financingioo and what he felt was too 
shallow a treatment of the competing judicial philosophies of the candidates, loi
97 Jim Gransbery, “Justices nearly tied,” The Billings Gazette, October 
21, 1992, lA.
98 “Defeated Trieweiler may ask recount,” The Billings Gazette, 
November 4, 1992, 2B.
99 Tumage interview.
100 Trieweiler interview transcript, 12.
101 Ibid., 17-18.
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But he said the “high profile” election produced a better informed electorate 
than most judicial races and a population certainly better informed than it is 
through an appointive process: “It wasn’t good for me—I hated it—but I think 
it was really good. I think it was the best thing that ever happened to people in 
this state in terms of learning something about their judiciary.”i02 
Furthermore, Trieweiler said he thinks his races, particularly the first one in 
1990 against former Attorney General Mike Greeley, “raised the level of 
consciousness about the courts and the court” and would encourage other 
attorneys to run for the court. 103 Trieweiler said his victory over Greeley 
proved that a political unknown could defeat a “strong political figure” in a 
court race. 104
Not surprisingly, Tumage and Trieweiler have vastly different opinions 
today about allowable comment under the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Tumage’s interpretation of the canons would preclude most comment on 
cases. Tumage believes future cases, current cases and past cases are off 
lim its to campaign debate. Justices “can’t talk about [the cases] that were 
there because they come back, not as the same case but as the same issue,” 
Tumage said. Tumage said the reason the canons were adopted “was to keep 
[justices] from promising voters that they’d go along with them, vote their 
way. This would not only be pre-deciding issues, but selling your vote. Justice
102 Ibid., 11.
103/6 id , 9.
104/6 id ,  10.
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is not for sale.”i05 Tumage’s moral certainty about the issue of campaign 
debate places any issue that might come before the court out of the realm of 
candidates’ comment.
Trieweiler’s view, held with as much moral conviction, is much broader. 
“There’s no canon.. that prevents you from discussing decisions that you’ve 
already made.”i06 Trieweiler said candidates who have not been on the court 
and have no record have a problem because they can address only what they 
might do prospectively, but he said voters can and should compare the voting 
records of judicial candidates and “ask them why they did what they did.”
Their votes and reasoning are a matter of public record, anyway, because 
votes and reasoning form the essence of judicial opinions, he said.io?
C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
Winning—and even losing— a “high profile” statewide election takes 
money, and the source of money for supreme court elections remains a 
sticking point for many of the same reasons raised by Montana convention 
delegates in 1972. Then the fear was of corporate influence. Today, in addition 
to fear of corporate influence, there is a strong sentiment that the plaintiffs’ 
bar—lawyers making their livelihood from damage awards to plaintiffs-—may 
try to “buy” supreme court elections.
105 Tumage interview.
106 Trieweiler interview transcript, 18.
107 Ibid., 19.
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The finances of the Tumage-Trieweiler race offer a good example of the 
problems inherent in financing a judicial campaign. Trieweiler raised $163,434 
and spent $163,229. Tumage raised $209,404 and spent $209,304. By 
contrast, Attorney General Joe Mazurek raised and spent about $105,000 
defeating Republican challenger Jack Sands. Karla Gray, running to keep her 
seat against lukewarm opposition from Joseph Nascimento, raised about 
$65,000. Nascimento raised roughly $2,000, most of it his own m o n e y ,  los 
Lawyers or their spouses who contributed more than $35 accounted for about 
68 percent of Trieweiler’s total contributions. They contributed $92,585, 
many contributing the meudmum allowable $750. Tumage raised almost 
$40,000 from lawyers contributing more than $35, or 20 percent of those 
contributions to his campaign. Other identifiable constituencies appearing on 
Tumage’s campaign contributors’ list are banker/broker/investor/CPA 
contributions totzdUng just over $17,700 (9 percent of his contributions over 
$35); and doctors and hospital interests, who contributed $20,187 (10 percent).
The PAC contributions are even more revealing. Trieweiler picked up 
the maximum allowable contribution, $2,000, from the Montana Education 
Association, the state’s largest teachers union, and from a group called 
Montana Law-PAC. He received $1,000 apiece from the Chauffeurs 
Teamsters & Helpers and the Friends of Max Baucus. Local teachers unions 
in Billings, Butte, Glendive, Great Falls, Helena and Missoula all contributed 
smaller amounts ranging from $100 to $900. He also picked up contributions
108 “Court race draws money,” The Billings Gazette, October 20, 1992, 
7A; “Challenger runs to make a point,” The Billings Gazette, October 31, 1992, 
2B.
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from the state AFL-CIO and union organizations in Spokane and Cleveland. 
Tum age’s $2,000 PAG contributions came from the Contractors of Montana, 
the Medical PAC and the Montana Auto Dealers PAC. The Realtors PAC 
donated $1,000. Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather and Dorsey Whitney, 
large Billings firms with corporate clients, donated $1,500 and $1,000 
respectively through their PAC’s. Other PAC contributions to Tumage ranged 
from $96.76 to $750 and came from the Montana Independent Bankers 
Association, First Bank System, Norwest (Bank) State PAC, Atlantic 
Richfield, Burlington Northern and the Plum Creek Good Government Fund in
Seattle. 109
The sources of this money are clearly identifiable as separate interests. 
Business interests, large law firms specializing in defending insurance 
companies, medical interests—traditional Republican 
constituencies—contributed to Tumage. Labor unions, plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
even Montana’s Democratic Senator—traditional Democratic 
constituencies—contributed to Trieweiler. Significantly, Trieweileris 
contributions lagged behind Tumage’s to the extent that, after the poll results 
showing the race to be a dead heat were released in late October, Trieweiler put 
$17,950 of his own money into his campaign.
Tumage, who made an issue out of campaign financing by charging 
Trieweiler with trying to buy the election, says he cannot say today who gave 
money to his campaign. “I would hope that’s typical,” he said, because it would
109 All judicial campaign finance information is from the official reports 
filed with the state Fair Campaign Practices office, Ed Argenbright, 
commissioner.
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be “a gross violation of your oath of office to keep track” and favor 
contributors. Tumage said he doubted the contributions by lawyers to him and 
Trieweiler could accurately be documented as “plaintiffs” and “defense” 
attorney money because most Montana law firms—indeed, most Montana 
lawyers—do not isolate their practice to only defense or plaintiffs work. In 
fact, Tumage believes most lawyers have less interest in the supreme court 
elections than in district court elections simply because most lawyers do not 
come before the supreme court. Of the 3,500 lawyers licensed to practice in 
Montana, Tumage says only 500 or so are in court regularly. Tumage said the 
outcome of the supreme court race will not improve odds for either plaintiffs or 
defense attom eys. “There may be some feeling among those actively litigating 
that they have an interest in the outcome” of the election, Tumage said, 
particularly among “the plaintiffs bar because they want bigger and better 
lawsuits.” But Tumage said both defense and plaintiffs attomeys, if  the bar 
could be divided as such, share an overriding common interest in more 
litigation. Electing one justice or another would not affect that overriding 
common goal, Tumage said.no
Trieweiler differed. Calling campaign financing “the only problem 1 have 
with the elective judiciary,”! 11 he said his ability to raise money was hampered 
“because 1 don’t have a wealthy constituency, other than lawyers.”! 12
110 Tumage interview.
111 Trieweiler interview transcript, 2.
112 76W., 3.
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Further, Trieweiler thought that campaign contributions do buy something, 
not something as grossly wrong as a justice’s vote on a case, but something 
more subtle. He said he frequently has “major contributors on both sides of 
the case, so all of the time you are voting against people who are major 
contributors.” However he pointed out that not every case that comes before 
the court gets the same degree of attention because there is so much work to 
do. Cases involving friends or lawyers he thinks highly of will get more careful 
attention, Trieweiler said. However, Trieweiler did not see an effort to buy 
“influence”—if that means buying a justice’s vote—as the major motivator 
behind campaign contributions. The reason lawyers give, and the reason the 
money from plaintiffs attomeys goes to one camp while defense attomeys 
contribute to another, is because the contributors believe they are giving to a 
person whose philosophy is similar to their own. “We end up getting supported 
by people who think the way we do. .. .[Blankers support Tumage because 
Tumage is a banker. He comes to the court thinking like a banker and they 
know that and that’s why they support him. He doesn’t think like a banker 
because he got contributions from b a n k e r s . ” H 3
Tumage, Trieweiler and Gray all doubted that lawyers’ “interest” in the 
outcome of a judicial election amounted to their influence over the court’s 
decisions. ‘W e necessarily have to take money from lawyers because the 
general public is not interested enough or doesn’t understand enough to care 
enough to be involved in a judicial campaign, especially [a supreme court
113 Ibid., 13-14.
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campaign],” Gray said. “And so we take money from ail kinds of lawyers. And 
they come up here and they lose cases.”H4
Tumage noted that campaign contributions are one way of gaining voice 
in a nation devoted to free speech. For example, Tumage said, teachers 
contribute to candidates for the superintendent of the office of public 
instmction, and no one would suggest that the teachers' interest in the 
outcome of that race should preclude their contributions, us
Finally, Trieweiler said that limitations on campaign contributions and 
publicizing them cuts the effect of contributors’ influence on the court. “If 
somebody could contribute $50,000 to a candidate they could probably buy an 
awful lot of influence, but when an individual can only contribute $750—no one 
is going to risk their career for a $750 contribution. Even though they might 
really appreciate it, and think fondly of that person, they are not going to 
jeopardize their future for a $750 c o n t r i b u t i o n . ” H 6
Campaign expenditures offer another field for examination. Given that 
court issues are complicated, 30-second spots on television and radio, which 
are the biggest expense in court campaigns, may not add anything significant 
to voters’ understanding of the court. Tumage, who hired Fifth Avenue 
Advertising in Helena to handle all his media advertising for $64,000, said one 
problem he has with the elective system is that a candidate with money can
114 Gray interview transcript, 6-7.
115 Tumage interview.
116 Trieweiler interview transcript, 16.
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“overwhelm the voters with a media blast "n? Trieweiler, on the other hand, 
who spent around $69,000 on radio and TV advertising, views advertising as “a 
good way to overcome an unfair advantage that your opponent might have 
because of that person’s political c o n n e c t i o n s . ” us
Although all of the justices had some reservations about public 
financing of judicial elections, they all favored it in principle. Trieweiler noted 
that the provisions for qualifying for the money would be critical. Tumage said 
he doubted that Montana, with the many burdens on its budget, would be able 
adequately to fund statewide judicial campaigns, though he thought the idea a 
good one as long as the funds were limited and accepting the funds meant that 
you could not put other money into the campaign.
D. THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
The appointment process, which has filled six out of the 15 judicial 
openings since the 1973 creation of the Judicial Nomination Commission, 
raises a spate of different questions. Recent controversies focus on two 
problems with Montana’s appointment system. The first involves the method 
members of the Judicial Nomination Commission use to fill supreme court 
vacancies. The second centers on the selection of members of the nominating 
commission itself.
First, when James Nelson of Cut Bank was appointed to the supreme 
court by Govemor Marc Racicot in April 1993, the political division among
117 Tumage interview.
118 Trieweiler interview transcript, 17.
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members of the Judicial Nomination Commission became public knowledge. 
The tally sheet submitted to the govemor by the Judicial Nomination 
Commission was pubhshed in newspapers statewide April 9, 1993. It showed 
that four of the commissioners rated Roger Tippy of Helena first among the 
nine applicants who survived the commission’s first cut, while three of the 
commissioners rated Tippy either last or eighth among the nine finalists.
Tippy had been Tumage’s campaign manager in the Tumage-Trieweiler race. 
Charles Johnson, the Lee Newspapers Bureau Chief, relied on handwriting 
comparisons and analysis by “court watchers” to determine that the first- 
place votes came from the commission’s four non-attomeys, all appointed by 
Stan Stephens, the Republican govemor Trieweiler had accused Tumage of 
being too familiar with. The last-place and eighth-place votes were believed to 
be from the commission’s two lawyers, appointed by the state supreme court, 
and the commission chairman. District Judge James Sorte, chosen by his 
fellow district judges. James Regnier, a Missoula lawyer, received first- or 
second-place votes from the commissioners who rated Tippy at the bottom 
and seventh-, eighth- or ninth-place votes from three of the four other 
commissioners. One commissioner rated Tippy first and Regnier second, but 
the rest of the votes follow a similar pattem: if Tippy was at the top of a 
commissioner’s list, Regnier was at the bottom and vice versa.
The result of such a voting procedure, assuming that the commission 
does contain a number of loyal party appointees, is that the candidate least 
offensive to either side will get the commission’s highest recommendation. In 
this case, that was Richard Ranney of Missoula, who got one first-place vote,
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two second-place votes, three fourth-place votes and a sixth-place vote. The 
fact that the commission must send at least three names and may send up to 
five names to the govemor and that the govemor must choose from this list 
checks this weakness in the procedure. The names of both Regnier and Tippy 
were submitted to the govemor, along with Ranneys, Gerald Allen’s and 
James Nelson’s . T h e  govemor chose Nelson April 16 from among this 
group. Nelson was the lowest-rated of the five candidates whose names were 
submitted under the commission’s procedure. Racicot’s decision was made 
after the press reports revealed the divided voting among commission 
members.
The division among commissioners involved in the Nelson appointment 
hints at problems with the selection of members of the Judicial Nomination 
Commission. The legislature amended the statute governing the membership 
of the commission in 1991, allowing for staggered terms. As Johnson pointed 
out in his April 9 news article, the Judicial Nomination Commission was 
structured with terms that meant the sitting govemor chose judges from lists 
submitted by a commission dominated by his predecessor’s appointees. 
“Through most of his term, Republican Stephens, for example, got 
recommendations from a commission on which four of the seven members 
were appointed by his predecessor, Democratic Gov. Ted Schwinden,” Johnson 
wrote. 120 However, Stephens, having complained about the choices given him
119 Charles S. Johnson, “Tally shows split on judicial commission,” The 
Billings Gazette, April 9, 1993, 3C.
120 Ibid.
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by the commission, urged the 1991 Legislature to change the terms, which it 
did. One member of that commission said that the Legislature intended to get 
rid of all the sitting commissioners in 1991. But since the supreme court 
appointed the lawyer members, the Legislature had to settle for ousting the 
lay members only, 121 The 1991 change meant Stephens could appoint all new 
lay members, the result of which appears on the April 1993 tally sheet.
Controversy around the membership of the commission brewed again in 
January 1994 when the supreme court made its two appointments to the 
body. This time, Trieweiler accused Tumage of trying to stack the commission 
by replacing the two members without fully involving the court’s other six 
j u d g e s .  122 Trieweiler claims that appointments to the judicial nominating 
commission in the past were done after a conference discussion. In this 
instance, however, Trieweiler says Tumage proposed replacements for sitting 
members Robert James and C.W. Leaphart Jr. without conference discussion. 
Tumage got five signatures on the order replacing Leaphart and James before 
Trieweiler knew the appointment was being c o n s i d e r e d .  123 Trieweiler, who is 
the only justice not to have signed the order, publicly charged Tumage with an
121 C.W. William Leaphart Jr., interview by author, Telephone 
interview, Billings, Montana, March 22, 1994.
122 Charles S. Johnson, “Trieweiler: Tumage tactic stacks panel on 
judiciary,” The Billings Gazette, January 14, 1994, 3C.
123 Trieweiler interview transcript, 4.
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effort to pack the commission with members who shared Tumage’s philosophy
,1 2 4
These problems with the makeup of the nominating commission aside, it 
should be noted that every justice interviewed believed James Nelson to be a 
good appointment. Therefore, even a highly partisan commission cannot 
completely control the outcome of the selection. Furthermore, Gray said she 
preferred an appointed judiciaiy to an elected one because “the kinds of things 
that you have to be good at to get elected in the first instance are not 
necessarily the kinds of things that make you a g o o d  j u d g e . ” i2 5  Gray said a 
nominating commission is a better screen for the kinds of qualities that do 
make good justice, including community involvement. “Unless you’ve been the 
kind of lawyer whose cases are more often in the public eye and get a lot of 
media attention,” it is hard to build the statewide constituency that could win 
you an election, she s a i d .  126 she preferred the odds with a nominating 
commission.
As Gray pointed out in the beginning, no system is perfect and the 
advantages of one tend to be the disadvantages of the other. The nominating 
commission may be susceptible to cronyism, but it allows a relatively unknown 
figure politically, like Gray, an opportunity to interview for and land a 
job she wants and—according to lawyers on both sides of the defense/plaintiffs
124 Johnson, “Trieweiler: Tumage...”
125 Gray interview transcript, 13-14.
126 Ibid., 1.
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divide—is good at. Yet Trieweiler, who also wanted the job very much, doubted 
the nomination system would ever choose him, and advocates doing away with 
it altogether in favor of the “survival of the fittest” aspects of the election 
method.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Gray’s observation that each method of judicial selection has 
strengths and weaknesses, and that the strengths of the elective method tend 
to be the inverse of those of the appointive method and vice versa, provides the 
best beginning point from which to offer conclusions and recommendations. 
Anyone’s recommendations regarding judicial selection will be predicated on the 
relative value the observer assigns to the competing elements that define the 
judiciary in a democracy. The resultant balance will either favor popular 
checks on judicial power or place greater weight on what Gray called “the truly 
critical independence and impartiality of the j u d i c i a r y . ” 127 One’s view of the 
policy-making power of the court profoundly affects one’s beliefs about how 
much authority the public should have over the selection of judges. But those 
views probably arise out of an even more fundamental source. John Schiltz, 
arguing before Montana’s Constitutional Convention that the electorate 
provides “the best screening process in the world,” 128 Terry Trieweiler saying 
that “I have a lot more faith in the electorate than 1 have in nominating 
c o m m i s s i o n s ” i2 9  — even Gordon Wood writing about the politics of the 1780s 
— may be reacting as much to a heartfelt belief in populism as to a
i27Gray interview transcript, 2.
128 Transcript, 1090.
129 Trieweiler interview transcript, 7.
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dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. Similarly Gray—and Alexander 
Hamilton, for that matter—may be predisposed to view with suspicion “the 
people” as evaluators of judicial quality. Both sides are equally right. The 
analyst is left with Madison McClellan’s recomendation that the variables in 
the selection process should be analyzed not for their purposes but for their 
results, because the methods may not produce the intended results.
A. THE ELECTION PROCESS PREFERRED 
Evidence from Montana’s recent judicial selections suggests that 
election is a superior system to the appointive system used in Montana. 
Naturally, this conclusion is not without qualification. There is no perfect 
system. But overall, the weaknesses of the elective system as practiced are 
less damaging than the weaknesses of the appointive system as practiced.
The weaknesses of both systems can be analyzed and compared when divided 
into the following categories: (1) the importance of “influence,” defined here as 
the desire of (and relative success of) various groups to control the selection 
process; (2) the extent of justices’ policy-making power and its effect on how 
justices should be chosen in a democratic society; (3) the relative abilities of 
the electorate or a nominating commission to find and select good justices; (4) 
whether judicial independence can be secured in an elective system.
1. The Importance of “Influence”
Both the elective and appointive systems are susceptible to 
influence—that is, the desire of various groups to control the outcome of the 
selection process—but of different kinds, or from different groups. The major 
problem affecting the elective process is summed up in Chief Justice Tumage’s
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complaint that a candidate with a lot of money can “overwhelm the voters 
with a media blast.”i30 Since races for the supreme court are statewide, a 
vigorously contested race costs at least $150,000. Both Tumage and 
Trieweiler spent over that amount in 1992. Whether this money comes from 
lawyers, as it did with Trieweiler, or from traditional Republican constituencies, 
as it did with Tumage, one cannot assume it comes without strings. Lawyers 
who, in combination with their spouses, contributed $1,500 to Trieweiler’s 
campaign certainly expected to get something out of that investment.
Probably they expected nothing more than to elect a kindred spirit to a court 
that does have a significant role to play in their livelihood. Also, Tumage’s 
campaign contributors might be sorry to discover that he has no idea who they 
are. Though civic spirit is not to be completely discounted as a motivator for 
campaign contributions, it is doubtful that pure civic-mindedness could 
account for $200,000 in campaign contributions.
The biggest weakness to the elective system is campaign financing. A 
lot of money poured into a judicial campaign does influence the outcome of the 
election. In this respect Chief Justice Tumage is wrong: justice, at least in 
terms of seats on the supreme court, certainly is for sale. It costs about 
$200,000. However, it is being sold at a competitive auction to many people 
for relatively small amounts. The competitive aspect of the fundraising may 
be the best protection people can hope for against one interest controlling the 
process. Though Trieweiler’s constituency—clearly identifiable as a 
“Democratic” one—did not raise as much money as Tumage’s clearly
130 Tumage interview.
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Republican constituency, it raised a competitive sum. As long as these two 
interests are free to compete for seats on the court, they should balance one 
another out.
Limits to campaign contributions and publication of the contributors’ 
lists help reduce the “influence” purchased through campaign contributions, 
but they do not eliminate it. Trieweiler is probably right that no one is going to 
jeopardize a career for a $750 contribution. That the justices vote in cases 
generally in keeping with the interests which financed their elections should 
surprise no one. Voters who did not know that Tumage and Trieweiler had 
raised a lot of money, and who did not have a general idea of where it came 
from, have only themselves to blame. This is not a perfect system, but 
pubHcation of contributors’ lists and limits to contributions help make it 
superior to the alternative.
Even taking into account the imperfections of the elective system  
regarding influence, the elective method is clearly superior to the appointive 
method, which is plagued with a different sort of influence problem. The 
controversies over the current commission’s membership confirm the 1972 
Constitutional Convention’s delegates’ worst fears. Their suspicions that 
commissions were susceptible to control by factions are proven right by the 
membership and operation of the current Judicial Nomination Commision.
The commission’s redesign in 1991 allowed it to become a political tool. The 
votes detailed in the April 9, 1993, Lee newspaper story show that four of the 
seven members on that commission voted for political favorites. One member 
admitted in the newspaper story that “[t]he Stephens appointees are more
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inclined to pick some who tend to be more conservative people in the broad 
sense of the t e r m . ” is i Since then, the supreme court replaced the two law yer  
members of the commission in a procedure that was tainted by partisanship. 
Trieweiler*s complaint that his voice was silenced in this appointment process 
is well taken.
Possibly the current membership’s clearly political agenda is an 
aberration. C.W. William Leaphart Jr., who served on the commission from 
1978—six years after the commission’s creation by the Legislature following 
the Constitutional Convention—until 1994, says the commission did not 
appoint justices to fill any political agenda until the 1991 Legislature revised 
the commission’s makeup. Leaphart said he believed one of the commission’s 
prime tasks was to keep the governor’s cronies from achieving seats on the 
supreme court, and he thought the commission prior to 1991 had accomplished 
this g o a l .  132 On the other hand, there was no particular reason for a rift to 
develop between the commission and the govemor prior to 1991 because all 
the governors were Democrats after the Constitutional Convention until Stan 
Stephens was elected in 1988.
Leaphart predicts the commission’s membership will balance out again 
in time. Nevertheless, its membership and conduct today—especially in the 
light of the January 1994 appointments by the supreme court^strengthen
131 Charles S. Johnson, “Tally shows split on judicial commission,” The. 
Billings Gazette, April 9, 1993, 3C. The comment came from James Mockler 
of Helena, a Stephens appointee.
132 Leaphart interview.
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the argument that commissions are more susceptible to rigging than elections 
are. This is politics, and interested groups will try to engineer the outcome. 
Both methods are tainted, but it is harder to fix an election involving 400,000 
voters than it is to fix a commission with seven members.
2. The Extent of the Policy-Making Role of Justices and Its Effect on How 
Justices Should Be Chosen in a Democratic Society
The most persuasive reason that supreme court justices should be 
elected rather than appointed is simply that they do make policy. The people 
have every right to control the membership of the supreme court based on 
that tenet alone. Certainly their policy-making role is limited, but even under 
Gray’s or Tumage’s vision of the policy-making role of a justice—that it occurs 
only rarely and is highly confined—the cases in which it does occur are 
important to people.
More important, the justice’s “philosophy”— which Holmes insisted was 
more “experience” than “logic”—has more effect on decisions than either Gray 
or Tumage would allow. Supreme court justices affect the lives of people as 
certainly as any legislator. They affect people intimately when they rule that 
a stillborn baby is a person for purposes of seeking damages against a doctor. 
They affect people importantly when they rule that the state improperly taxed 
federal retirees and that it must refund those taxes no matter how adversely 
the state’s budget may be affected by the refunds. In each of these examples, 
justices decide out of a rational process more in keeping with Holmes’ views 
than with Frankfurter’s. The life of the law, when the decision is to determine 
legal “personhood” for a stillbirth, certainly must be experience and not logic,
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as Holmes suggested. Though logic plays a role in this as in any legal 
argument, the determination in this case supports Holmes’ theory that “the 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions 
of public policy.. .even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men” 
have a bigger role to play. The justices themselves as much as admitted this 
when the majority opinion held that all subsequent questions of this nature will 
need to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Justices ruling on these complex issues may feel frustrated by their 
accountabihty to voters who have never read a supreme court opinion. But 
voters do have a right to “hold their feet to the fire,” as Gray put it, even if “the 
law”—meaning attention to precedent and judicial restraint—imposes 
constraints on how the justice rules. In the end, all justices, equally 
constrained by “the law,” disagree significantly about what the law says. 
Voters are as capable of evaluating justices’ legal opinions as are the lay 
members of a judicial nomination commission. They are entitled to do so by 
the effects of judicial decisions. The justices should remedy the problem of the 
ill-informed electorate by being more forthcoming during political campaigns 
about decisions and reasoning. Their philosophies are an important part of 
how they decide cases. Their voting records do reveal their philosophies. After 
all, even under the Missouri Plan, the prototype for the appointive judiciary, 
judges must run “against their records.”
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3. The Relative Abilities of the Electorate 
and Nominating Commissions to Select Good Justices
On its face, a judicial nominating commission like Montana’s, composed 
of two lawyers, a judge and four lay members, ought to do a better job selecting 
qualified people for the court than the electorate can. Leaphart said the 
commission made it a regular practice to telephone attorneys around the state 
to find out about candidates for judicial nomination. The lawyers on the 
commission called other lawyers to find out if the nominees were competent 
lawyers, were well thought of in the legal community, and were up to the 
demands of the court’s case l o a d .  133 This seems a far superior method of 
finding good judges than relying on voters who may have only a vague idea of 
what supreme court justices do.
The electorate does not systematically “select” good candidates to run 
for the supreme court under the current system. Candidates self-select based 
on factors which may not have anything to do with whether they will be good 
judges. The main factor operating on this selection process is money. If 
candidates cannot attract the money to support a statewide race, they should 
not run. Gray is probably right that this criterion eliminates a lot of lawyers 
who have not had media attention or who do not appeal to a specific moneyed 
constituency, like plaintiffs attorneys or doctors.
Trieweiler’s answer to the weaknesses of the selection features of the 
elective system is unconvincing. True, the elective process produced him. The 
characteristics he possesses—his liberal philosophy, his open commumcation
133 Leaphart interview.
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style—are healthy for the court and unlikely to have won him appointment, at 
least by the current commission. But his experience in the 1992 chief justice 
race is not likely to inspire others to follow in his footsteps, as he suggested. He 
himself admitted it was unpleasant. Perhaps his 1990 race against Greeley is 
a better example of a race to inspire others to run. But the fact is that in 1994 
two seats on the supreme court will be filled in uncontested races.
This raises another aspect of weakness in the elective process: 1994’s 
uncontested elections may indicate that the elective process discourages 
interest among lawyers in sitting on the court. In a typical judicial 
appointment, at least 20 lawyers apply for the seat, yet in the 1994 supreme 
court election two candidates will run unopposed. One of the candidates. 
Nelson, is an incumbent only by virtue of his 1992 appointment, hardly 
entitling him to a firm hold on the seat; the other is a newcomer to politics 
running unopposed for an open seat. One of the former lawyer members of the 
Judicial Nomination Commission argues that these uncontested races show a 
major weakness in the elective system—it does not generate the interest that 
the appointive system does.is-*
Trieweiler argued that the element of risk involved in an election to the 
supreme court naturally reduces interest. “I have a feeling,” he said, “there 
are a lot of qualified lawyers who have the attitude if someone hands me this 
job, or if I can be appointed to it, Fd like to be a j u d g e . ” iS 5  Trieweiler made clear
134 Robert James, interview by author. Telephone interview, Billings, 
Montana, April 1, 1994.
135 Trieweiler interview transcript, 9.
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that he felt this interest was inferior to the interest of a candidate willing to 
subject himself to the rigors of a statewide campaign.
There is no easy answer to these weaknesses in the elective system, but 
both John Schiltz and Terry Trieweiler, who ran for chief justice of the supreme 
court and lost, offer persuasive defense of the elective system over the 
appointive system. Schiltz said in the debate over judicial selection at the 
Montana Constitutional Convention, “if I have to choose between one or the 
other. I'm going to the electorate every time, because I had a chance to be 
elected.... At least I had a c h a n c e . ” i3 6  Trieweiler echoed this sentiment 
throughout his interview. Without contested elections, no one can take the risk 
to unseat a justice and the result for the public is an impermissible loss of 
voice.
Finally, two more persuasive complaints about the electorate’s ability 
to select good justices are that voters are poorly informed and that they tend to 
send the same judges back to office again and again— “like sheep,” as Jean 
Bowman argued on the floor of Montana’s constitutional convention. Gray 
correctly identified the weakness in the second argument: it presupposes that 
more justices should be thrown out.i^s in fact, justices do lose their seats 
periodically and over issues that matter to the electorate. Justice Gene Daly 
lost to L.C. Gulbrandson in 1982 after a campaign dominated by a “law and
136 Transcript, 1027.
137 Transcript, 1031.
138 Gray interview transcript, 4.
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order theme. The most celebrated example among believers in the election 
system is Paul Hatfield’s 1976 victory over sitting justice Wesley Castles for 
the chief justice s seat. Hatfield ran against Castles’ record, saying that the 
court had fallen under the influence of the state’s major corporations. The 
voters chose Hatfield even though Castles had served on the court since
1958.139
Justices and scholars agree that the electorate is not well informed 
about courts, their role, or their personnel. Justices and scholars disagree over 
how to improve voter information. Gray was uncomfortable with any kind of 
campaign tactic that might increase the voters’ misunderstanding that a 
supreme court justice is simileir to a representative. For instance, she balked 
at the idea of any sort of “judicial report card” of the type that political action 
committees produce for legislative candidates. The issues involved in casting a 
judicial vote are much too complicated to be simplified on a “voter tally sheet,” 
Gray said. Trieweiler, on the other hand, had no problem with tally sheets on 
judicial votes. Trieweiler was confident that he could “explain [his] votes to at 
least 51 percent of the voters’ satisfaction, if [he] had a c h a n c e . The main
139 Schiltz mentioned the Hatfield-Castles race in correspondence, but 
the main source of information regarding the race was Trieweiler. Trieweiler 
interview transcripts, 1. Hatfield was not the first candidate to challenge a 
member of the 1960s supreme court on the issue of its alleged corporate 
favoritism. Schiltz also tried the tactic. An October 6, 1970, Schiltz campaign 
advertisement from The Billings Gazette reads, “In the last 5 years, 107 cases 
involving persons injured through negligence have come before the Supreme 
Court. In 72 of these cases, district judges or juries had found for the injured 
person. My opponent voted to reverse the district judges or juries in 45 of these 
cases—62 percent.” Schiltz’ opponent was James Harrison.
140 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
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thing missing from judicial campaigns is the opportunity for candidates to 
explain votes without concern that they will violate the Canons of Judicial 
Ethics.
Trieweiler suggested one method to improve voter information would be 
televised candidate forums sponsored by the University of Montana Law 
School. He said he and his opponent in the 1990 election, Mike Greeley, 
participated in a number of such forums, never televised. The law school's 
participation, with questions devised and asked by law professors, should 
dispense with the difficulties presented by the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 
Candidates should not resist answering questions posed by informed legal 
experts.
Despite its weaknesses in identifying and selecting good judicial 
character, the elective process is superior to the appointive process in this 
area. Leaphart said the current commission is more interested in justices’ 
political connections than in their suitability to the work of a supreme court 
justice. The purpose of the judicial nominating commission—to find qualified 
lawyers to serve as judges and to check a governor’s power to pack the 
court—may not achieve its intended result with the current commission.
The electorate may not have any better record than the nominating 
commission at producing the intended result, but all the justices interviewed 
agreed that justices should face the electorate. Trieweiler believed the election 
process actually improved any justice’s performance. Gray thought retention 
elections were sufficient to provide accountability to the public. However, 
giving voters only “accept or reject” options, without giving them someone to
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vote for, takes away the whole point of voting. A retention election would 
become the thing critics fear elections to be now, the voters' rubber-stamp of a 
judge they never chose in the first place.
4. Can Judicial Independence Be Secured in an Elective System?
The most difficult hurdle to surmount while arguing in favor of electing 
judges involves judicial independence. Elections are won by majorities and 
“tyranny of the majority” has been an identified evil since Madison’s time. 
Elected judges have much to fear from unpopular decisions. Though Trieweiler 
claims to have made more unpopular decisions than any other current 
justicei4i and is convinced he could explain his decisions to voters,142 Gray’s 
problem with elections is well taken. She says the court is not a political body. 
It is a legal body. “And therein is the hugest chasm that anyone could 
imagine,” she said.i43 Gray worries about the elements of the election process 
that reinforce the impression among voters that the court is a political body. 
For example, Gray said popular majorities may unseat a justice because of a 
perceived deficiency on the court, such as the perception that the court is not 
tough enough on criminals. The problem with this action reflects voters’ 
misunderstanding of the courts and their role. Gray said, “The remedy, if there 
is sufficient popular support, is to go to the Legislature and get tougher laws.
141 He may be right. A December 31,1993 Billings Gazette article 
points out that Trieweiler was the supreme court’s most frequent dissenter for 
the third straight year. David Fenner, “Trieweiler had most high court 
dissents,” The Billings Gazette, December 31, 1993, Cl.
142 Trieweiler interview transcript, 6.
143 Gray interview transcript, 3.
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That’s part of the chasm between responding to what may at a moment be the 
popular will or the perceived will, and our job of following and of applying the 
law. 144 Gray’ s “chasm” and the financing of judical elections are the biggest 
problems with electing judges. Judges must have the courage and 
independence to make an unpopular decision.
The elective process does protect a different kind of judicial 
independence, however. Terry Trieweiler may be right that no nominating 
commission would have chosen him, although Leaphart says the pre-1991 
nominating commission would have recommended Trieweiler. He is certainly 
correct in his assertion that only the election process allows an aspiring judge 
to “control [his] own destiny.” Trieweiler’s complaint that the appointive 
process puts the aspiring justice’s fate into the hands of “a small clique of 
politically appointed people” needs to be balanced against Gray’s concerns 
about the fickle nature of democratic majorities. Judicial independence, if 
viewed as complete independence from electoral majorities, will not be achieved 
through the elective process. But a more critical kind of independence is lost 
through the appointive process. Not only is the appointive process more 
susceptible to control by powerful cliques, but it also takes away the freedom 
of a candidate to throw his hat in the ring, to run the best campaign he can, 
and to trust himself to the voters.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Montana would benefit from electing all its supreme court justices, even 
those who are filling mid-term vacancies. Some of the flaws in the elective
144/bid., 5.
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process—the risk assumed by challenging an incumbent, the difficulty of 
rumung a statewide campaign without a support sytem, the problems raising 
money—could be reduced by making the elections partisan.
Justice Gray argued persuasively against partisan judicial elections, 
saying that party “labels” would feed the voter misconception that “we 
represent if not individual voters’ views, party’s views.... I do think it would be 
easier for voters because they are used to having those labels and translating 
those labels into a certain package of personal views. ..but that isn’t what we’re 
supposed to come here to do.”i4s The trend injudicial selection reform is to 
move away from elections generally, and far away from partisan elections. In 
fact, there are only 10 states that use partisan elections to select supreme 
court justices, and one of those (Pennsylvania) is in the middle of a scandal 
over its partisan election process that may well lead to an entirely appointive 
system. Of those remaining, six are deep South states which may have 
partisan elections as a holdover from their Democratic machine days.
Nevertheless, partisan elections are a more forthright way to conduct a 
selection process that is in fact run on something like “party lines” anyway. 
The practical result of the elections process is to divide candidates—and the 
resources candidates rely on—into two readily identifiable camps. Identif^ng 
the constituencies officially with party labels would only be calling a spade a 
spade. Trieweiler’s point that bankers gave money to Tumage because 
Tumage thinks like a banker is important, especially since not all the voters 
might have known Tumage’s philosophy or background. In fact, Tumage s
145 Gray interview transcript, 13.
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case offers an excellent example of the way nonpartisan campaigns muddy the 
waters of an election. Tumage’s ties to the Republican Party are longstanding. 
He was the Republican leader in the Senate for many years before he came to 
the supreme court. His judicial philosophy certainly reflects the same values 
he held in the Senate. Why shouldn’t all the voters be given the benefit of his 
party label when he runs for the supreme court? The voters would gain 
because, as Gray noted, they are used to processing candidates using party 
labels.
Party support would alleviate some of the problems experienced by 
judicial candidates. They would not be faced with running a statewide 
campaign with no support system. Some of their funding would come from the 
party, lessening their reUance on lawyer contributions. Also, with the party 
fronting the opposition csmdidate, incumbents would more likely face vigorous 
opposition. This guess is home out in statistics from Montana’s partisan 
judicial election days, when 52 percent of supreme court justices experienced 
“meaningful opposition.”i46
A second recommendation is public financing of judicial campaigns. All 
of the justices interviewed favored public financing in principle. They know 
that this method is superior to relying on lawyers’ contributions. They know 
that lawyers’ contributions do form the major part of supreme court “war 
chests,” despite Tumage’s impressive fundraising in other quarters. However, 
in hght of the fact that the state legislature only last year did away with this 
provision, it is not a very realistic proposal.
146 Lopach, 157-
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Since neither of these two recommendations is likely to find a following, 
these less disruptive amendments could be made to the current system:
1. To reduce the stress and expense of a statewide campaign, justices 
could be elected on a regional basis, like members of the Public Service 
Commission. This change could increase the perception that supreme court 
justices “represent” specific interests, in this case regional ones; and it might 
lessen the court's role as the Montana Supreme Court, the only court that 
belongs to the whole state.
2. Televised debates between judicial candidates could be sponsored by 
the University of Montana Law School. This is an essential reform to a 
system that everyone agrees is deeply flawed by a poorly informed electorate. 
More vigorous debate is essential to improving voters' understanding of the 
court and its role, but the Canons of Judicial Ethics do place restraints on what 
shape this debate can take. The present system affords a sanctuary for a 
justice who does not want to talk about his record. Putting supreme court 
debates in the hands of professionals at the law school is a good way to get 
around this problem.
3. Lawyers might entertain the possibility of setting up an anonymous 
campaign fund, rather than donating sums to individual candidates. While the 
justices interviewed did not think this a bad idea exactly, they knew it was an 
impractical one. Tumage identified a key weakness in this plan, that some 
lawyers would not give money if they thought it would end up with a candidate 
they did not approve of. Also, as Gray pointed out, such funding might increase
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the perception that lawyers have a greater interest in the supreme court than 
ordinary citizens do.
4. The method of choosing members of the Judicial Nomination 
Commission could be revamped to insulate it from one-sided partisan influence. 
Equal representation by members of each party could be required on the 
commission. Such a restriction now applies to other boards, including the 
Board of Public Education. Since the Judicial Nomination Commission plays 
an integral role in placing people on the state supreme court, its membership 
should certainly be bi-partisan, much more certainly than boards with less 
consequence. Appointments to the supreme court have an enormous effect on 
pubhc policy and should reflect the participation of both parties, not just the 
participation of the party in power at any given time.
5. The supreme court should establish a protocol that requires a 
conference for choosing its members on the Judicial Nomination Commission. 
Trieweiler complained publicly that the supreme court’s January 1994 
appointments to the commission were made without sufficient involvement by 
members of the court. Without a rule governing this selection process it is 
possible through informal persuasion to control these critical appointments. 
The whole court should discuss, then decide on, its appointments to the Judicial 
Nomination Commission.
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